Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by Hsia, David C.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-1978
Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act
David C. Hsia
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David C. Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 Hastings L.J. 371 (1978).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol30/iss2/5
Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act
By DAviD C. HsiA*
Credit scoring is an empirical technique that uses statistical meth-
odology to predict the probability of repayment by credit applicants. A
typical system evaluates certain financial and nonfinancial characteris-
tics of each applicant on a scoring table (See Figure 1 on page 375).
The table derives from the creditor's past experience with similarly sit-
uated applicants and assigns a varying number of points to each of the
characteristics, depending upon the applicant's responses. The creditor
adds up the applicant's points to obtain a total score. If the applicant
scores higher than the predetermined cutoff, the creditor approves the
credit request.I
Recently, much political and legal controversy has surrounded the
role of scoring systems in analyzing creditworthiness. There is particu-
lar concern over the inherent potential of such systems for discrimina-
tion against federally protected classes of applicants.2 Observers also
disagree about the extent to which federal law applies to credit analy-
* Staff Attorney, Division of Consumer Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; B.A., Haverford College, 1972; S.D., Yale Law School, 1975; member of the
Illinois and District of Columbia bars. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Board of Governors or its staff. The
author wishes to thank Drs. Gary G. Chandler, Robert W. Johnson, and Edward M. Lewis
for their helpful comments on this manuscript. However, the author made all errors and
omissions.
The author particularly wishes to thank DaVeil Barrett and Ferne Hicks for typing this
manuscript.
1. See, ag., NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 152 (1972), reprintedin [1973] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) No. 215 [herein-
after cited as the NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT]; Roy & Lewis, Credit Scoring as a Manage-
ment Tool, CONSUMER CREDIT LEADER, Nov. 1971, at 21 [hereinafter cited as Management
Toot]; Main, -4 New Way to Score with Lenders, MONEY, Feb. 1977, at 73 [hereinafter cited
as Main]. For a list of relevant sources, see S. MILLER, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REGULATION (Purdue Credit Research Center Monograph No. 7,
1977).
2. Compare Capon, Credit Ratings and Rights, Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1977, at
A19, coL I with S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 403, 407 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 94-589].
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sis. 3 To date, this conflict has yielded considerably more questions
than answers.
This Article attempts to resolve some common misunderstandings
as to the nature and function of credit scoring, and to allay the confu-
sion regarding the application of the law to scoring systems. It also
seeks to illuminate those areas of the law whose impact on credit scor-
ing remains uncertain and to indicate the ways in which empirical sys-
tems of credit analysis may tend to discriminate illegally. Sections I
and II detail the practical reasons and scientific principles underlying
credit scoring, and Section III delineates the process by which scoring
systems are constructed. These sections are offered as introductory ma-
terial for those unfamiliar with credit scoring. The remaining sections
discuss legal problems associated with scoring.
The Reasons for Credit Scoring
Judgmental systems
Because the creditor seldom knows the applicant personally, and
because success or failure depends on extending credit to those who
will repay, the creditor needs some means of analyzing creditworthi-
ness.4 Traditional credit analysis uses human judgment to evaluate
creditworthiness. Credit officers analyze incoming applications in light
of their own prior experience and their employer's institutional guide-
lines.5 If, for example, plumbers or elderly applicants traditionally
3. See, e.g., Brandel, New Dangers Arise in Point Scoring, But You Can't Afford to be
Without It, BANKING, Mar. 1976, at 86; Redlining' with Credit Cards, Washington Post, July
20, 1977, at A22, col. I; Letter from Senator Donald Riegle to the Editor Of the Washington
Post (July 31, 1977), reprintedin Washington Post, July 31, 1977, at B6, col. 3; Stuart, 'Redlin-
ing' Charged in Credit Denial to Detroit Couple, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1977, at 19, col. 1;
Wilcox, U.S. Investigates Credit CardRedlining, Detroit News, Aug. 17, 1977, at 3-A, col. 1.
4. See R. COLE, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT (5th ed.
1976); R. ETTINGER & D. GOLIEB, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS (4th ed. 1956); E. REED,
COMMERCIAL BANK MANAGEMENT 210-33 (1963); R. ROBINSON, THE MANAGEMENT OF
BANK FUNDS 240-58 (1951).
Suppose that someone walks into a bank or store. That person wants to obtain certain
goods or services, but does not have sufficient funds to do so. The prospective customer
therefore requests credit. The creditor receiving the request does not know whether the
credit applicant will honor the promise to repay the loan. The creditor therefore needs
credit analysis.
Credit analysis is a method of determining whether an applicant constitutes a good or
bad credit risk. If the applicant repays the loan as agreed, the creditor will profit from the
interest it charges. Conversely, if the applicant defaults, the creditor stands to lose whatever
amount remains unpaid. Consequently, a creditor's ability to distinguish creditworthy from
noncreditworthy applicants is crucial to its success in the credit business.
5. See BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, JOB DESCRIPTIONS FOR BANK PERSONNEL
133-37 (1975); Speech by Dr. Edward M. Lewis, Consumer Bankers Association, Central
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have had trouble repaying, the credit officer will summarily reject fu-
ture applications from these groups. In theory, the institution directs its
credit officers to look for applicants with the (1) ability and (2) willing-
ness to repay.6 These two attributes would appear to cover every possi-
ble situation. An applicant with no means of repaying the credit
constitutes a poor risk, however good his or her intentions. Similarly,
an applicant who does not intend to repay should not receive credit,
regardless of personal wealth or income.
In practice, however, these judgmental systems of credit analysis
suffer from several critical flaws.7 First, the credit officer may have an
imperfect recollection of past experience, or one very troublesome inci-
dent may distort the officer's view of a particular group.
In addition, the judgmental system fails to react well to changes in
the composition and creditworthiness of the pool of credit applicants.
Conceivably, tree surgeons, for example, may have been poor credit
risks at one time. However, as years pass tree surgeons may improve
substantially as credit risks because there may be growing public inter-
est in proper care of trees and restrictive government licensing of new
tree surgeons. The credit officer might recall the previous unfortunate
credit experience with a tree surgeon and steadfastly refuse to extend
any tree surgeon credit. As a result, the creditor will never discover
that the creditworthiness of tree surgeons has improved.8
Western Section Annual Meeting (May 17, 1977); Interview with Mr. Edward Berger, Mont-
gomery Ward, by the Federal Reserve Board staff, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 19, 1974).
6. D. DURAND, RISK ELEMENTS IN CONSUMER INSTALMENT FINANCING 2 (Financial
Research Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Consumer In-
stalment Financing No. 8 (Technical ed. 1941)) [hereinafter cited as DURAND]; accord, au-
thorities cited note 4 supra. Credit officers also refer to the three "C's": character, capacity,
and collateral. Credit Scoring. The New Math of Credit Evaluation, CONSUMER MONTH,
May 1977, at 2 [hereinafter cited as New Math].
7. G. Chandler & J. Coffman, Using Credit Scoring to Improve the Quality of Con-
sumer Receivables: Legal and Statistical Implications, at 1-2 (Sept. 27, 1977) (Purdue Credit
Research Center, forthcoming Working Paper, originally presented at the Financial Man-
agement Association Annual Meeting, Seattle, Wash., Oct. 1, 1977) (on file with The Has-
tings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Chandler & Coffman]; Management Decision
Systems, A Systems Approach to Credit Scoring (Apr. 11, 1977) (available from MDS, Suite
2303, Two Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Ga. 30303) [hereinafter cited as MDS Systems Ap-
proach]; Executive Summary, CONSUMER MONTH, May 1977, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Exec-
utive Summary]; Roy & Lewis, The Credit Manager's Uncomfortable Posture, THE CREDIT
WORLD, Apr. 1971, at 10 [hereinafter cited as Roy & Lewis]; Roy, Why Credit Scoring?,
BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE 27 (April 1972) [hereinafter cited as Roy]; Interview with
Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc., in San Rafael, Cal. (June 28, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
FICO Interview].
8. See, ag., J. CULBERTSON, MONEY AND BANKING 507-75 (2d ed. 1977); D. KAMER-
SCHEN & E. KLISE, MONEY AND BANKING 513-620 (6th ed. 1976). Conversely, an experi-
ence-based policy of automatically approving credit applications from persons with incomes
November 1978]
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Judgmental systems also lack accuracy in identifying creditworthy
applicants because of unrealizable institutional guidelines. These
guidelines serve as a substitute for the experience that a new credit of-
ficer may lack. Unfortunately, many of these so-called credit policies
arise without empirical verification. Thus, the creditor's senior man-
agement may adopt a traditional slogan, such as the three "P's"9 or the
three "B's,"' 1 on little more than an intuitive notion that the principle
makes sense. In fact, a quantitative study might show that some people
in these discredited categories actually make excellent credit risks.
Without controlled research, the observer cannot ascertain the validity
of institutional guidelines."
Finally, judgmental systems may discriminate illegally. The credit
officer has complete discretion when weighing all the pertinent infor-
mation mentally. Personal appearance unquestionably plays a role in
the credit granting decision. Studies indicate that factors such as the
applicant's race, sex, marital status, and age may also receive consider-
ation.12 However, federal law now makes consideration of these factors
illegal discrimination.'
3
Despite these potential defects, judgmental systems of credit anal-
over $25,000 may not properly reflect the effects of rapid inflation. Many of the new appli-
cants with sufficient income to qualify under the old standard may in fact lack creditworthi-
ness because their income has failed to keep pace with the rising costs of living.
9. "Never lend to preachers, plumbers, or prostitutes." Main, supra note I; ef. M.
IRVING, THE BANK BOOK (1973) (suggesting other occupations as falling within the three
"P's'). However, do not confuse this with more general rules such as the three "C's," New
Math, supra note 6, at 2.
10. "Never lend to beauticians, bartenders, or barbers." Main, supra note 1.
11. See S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 2, at 6. Because little controlled research of this
nature apparently exists, most institutional guidelines probably have limited validity. E.
FIEDLER, MEASURES OF CREDIT RISK AND EXPERIENCE (1971).
Even the more abstract criteria such as "ability and willingness to repay" may prove
unreliable. What constitutes ability to repay? Experienced credit officers can recount tales
of unemployed fathers who nevertheless managed to keep making payments on their mort-
gages month after month, or of convicted felons with no declared income who continued
both to use and pay off their credit cards while incarcerated. An applicant's willingness to
repay is even more difficult to ascertain than his or her ability.
12. M. IRVING, THE BANK BOOK (1973); S. MCMICHAELS, MCMICHAELS APPRAISING
MANUAL (15th ed. 1970); NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 152; Hearings on
H.A 14856 and HR. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm
on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on HR 3386 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm on Banking and Currency, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961, and HA 5616 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Utah S&L Agrees to Bar Bias Against Women and
Singles, American Banker, Feb. 3, 1978, at I, col. 1; Utah Lender Agrees to Same Standards
for Female and Male Loan Applicants, Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1978, at D12, col. 1.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
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ysis are still widely used.14 Indeed, despite the possible failings enu-
merated above, judgmental systems provide their users with a relatively
effective approach to credit analysis. Many judgmental systems enjoy
extremely accurate predictions of creditworthiness, especially if oper-
ated by an experienced group of officers using well-tried institutional
guidelines. 15
Scoring systems
Credit scoring has developed as a recent alternative to judgmental
credit analysis. A scoring system typically consists of two main compo-
nents: a scoring table (Figure 1) developed from analysis of the credi-
tor's past applicants and a repayment probability table (Figure 2)
which relates total points scored on the scoring table with a percentage
probability of default or repayment.'
6
Figure 1-Hypothetical Credit Scoring Table*
Applicant's under 25 25-29 30-37 38-46 47-50 51-61 62 and up
Age years or no
answer
12 5 0 18 11 22 31
Time at under 1 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-9 10 or
Present Address year over no answer
Present Addr9_ 9 0 5 0 5 21 7
Age of None 0-1 2 3-4 5-7 8 or
Aut years over
0 12 16 13 3 0
Monthly under S125-270 5271 or Owns Rela- no
HoMing Cost s125 more Clear lives answer
0 10 12 12 24 7
Checking Savings




References 0 15 1
Major Credit None 1 2 3 4 and up
Card 0 5 10 15 20
Debt to 16% or
Income Ratio No Debts 1-5% 6-15% over
41 16 20 0
Size of
Downpayment None 1-15% 16-50% 50-85%
0 2 6 13
* This table does not reflect any creditor's actual experience, but is offered as an illus-
tration only.
14. Indeed, the vast majority of credit analysis systems are judgmental. Equal Credit
Opportunity, 63 FED. RES. BuLL. 101, 107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ECO]; Myers & Forgy,
The Development of Numerical Credit Evaluation Systems, 58 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 799, 800
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Myers & Forgy]; Roy & Lewis, Overcoming Obstacles in Using
Credit Scoring Systems, THE CREDIT WORLD, June 1970, at 17.
15. See authorities cited note 4 supra. See generally T. KtmN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SciENTIc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
16. See text accompanying note 1 supra; accord, Ewert & Chandler, Credit Formulasfor
Loan Extensions, ATLANTA ECONOMIC REv., July-Aug. 1974, at 34; Greer, The Optimal
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Figure 2-Hypothetical Repayment Probability Table










The scoring table typically contains six to twelve characteristics.
On the hypothetical scoring table in Figure 1, the characteristics in-
clude: age, time at present address, age of auto, monthly housing cost,
bank accounts, finance company references, major credit cards, debt to
income ratio, and amount of downpayment. Each characteristic con-
tains two or more attributes.17 Thus, the attributes: under 25 years, 25-
29, 30-37, 38-46, 47-50, 51-62, and 62 and up comprise the characteris-
tic "applicant's age" on the hypothetical table. The attributes therefore
constitute the various possible answers to the credit questions asked of
the applicant. The scoring system uses the answers to predict
creditworthiness. An attribute may encompass a single possible re-
sponse, such as no, yes, or no answer; or it may span a series of possible
responses, such as 2-5 years. The intervals spanned by the latter type of
attributes may change regularly, as with 0-5, 6-10, 11-15, etc.; or irregu-
larly, as with 1-2, 3-7, 8-11, etc. An applicant is assigned only one attri-
bute for each characteristic.
Finally, each attribute shares its cell with a numerical score. This
number expresses the degree to which the creditor's past experience sta-
tistically associates creditworthiness with that attribute when analyzed
in conjunction with the other characteristics in the system. Thus, a
high score does not indicate that past applicants with that attribute all
repay their loans on schedule, but that applicants combining this attri-
bute with other high score attributes make superior credit risks. Bor-
Credit Acceptance Policy, 2 J. FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 399 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Greer]; Myers & Forgy, supra note 14, at 799; Weingartner, Concepts and Utili-
zation of Credit-Scoring Techniques, BANKING, Feb. 1966, at 51 [hereinafter cited as
Weingartner].
17. See Fair, Isaac and Co., Inc., Concepts of Scoring 80 (Mar. 30, 1977) (publication
of Fair, Isaac and Co., Inc., 55 Mitchell Blvd., San Rafael, Cal. 94903) [hereinafter cited as
Concepts of Scoring]; Roy & Sanderson, Human Judgment vs. Credit Scoring, THE CREDIT
WORLD, Nov. 1972, at 8-14 [hereinafter cited as Roy & Sanderson].
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rowers behave in consistent, but nonprogressional ways which accounts
for the scores' tendency to change erratically from cell to cell rather
than always to ascend in a smooth curve.
The scoring system processes credit applications by noting the re-
sponses disclosed on the application and comparing them with the scor-
ing sheet.13 The creditor totals the scores for each of the applicant's
attributes. The total score either meets or fails to meet a predetermined
cutoff.19 The cutoff score determines whether the creditor rejects the
applicant, refers the application to a credit officer for further review,
obtains a more detailed credit report, or accepts the applicant immedi-
ately. The cutoff score derives from the creditor's business evaluation
of the repayment probability table and the acceptable default rate.20
Public interest in credit scoring
The importance of credit scoring to the public is principally a re-
sult of its increased utilization by large credit grantors. Several thou-
sand scoring systems currently analyze creditworthiness. 21 While the
number of applications processed by each system varies considerably,
their users include many of the country's largest lenders. Thus, scoring
systems process an increasing fraction of the 200 million applications
submitted to creditors each year.22
The uniformity imposed upon credit analysis by a single scoring
system also makes this technology increasingly important to the public.
For all practical purposes, under a judgmental system each individual
credit officer forms a separate system. The officer employs subjective
standards for analysis and creditworthiness, balancing all the pertinent
considerations mentally. Two officers of the same judgmental creditor
may easily disagree about the acceptability of the same application.23
In addition, even the most zealous of judgmental credit officers can
evaluate only a limited number of applications per day.24 In contrast, a
18. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17; Main, supra note 1; Weingartner, supra note 16.
19. See authorities cited note 18 supra; Hettenhouse & Wentworth, Credit Analysis
Model-A New Lookfor Credit Scoring, J. COMM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1971, at 26; Myers
& Forgy, supra note 14, at 806; Orgler, Evaluation of Bank Consumer Loans with Credit
Scoring Models, J. BANK RESEARCH, Spring 1971, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Orgler].
20. Section I describes the origin of the repayment probability table.
21. FICO Interview, supra note 7.
22. COMM'N ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONSUMER CREDr PROTECTION 4 (1977).
23. See authorities cited note 4 supra; Let's Clarfy Our Concept of Creditworthiness,
VmwPoImnS, Winter 1978, at 2.
24. See, ag., M. CORNS, THE PRAcTIcAL OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF A BANK
484-522 (2d ed. 1968).
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large scoring system can process an almost unlimited volume of appli-
cations, depending only upon the availability of clerks to apply the sys-
tem.2 5 Thus, a single scoring system can have a much greater impact
upon credit applicants than can any judgmental system. If the scoring
system works well, most applicants will receive fair treatment based on
their actual creditworthiness. However, if it works poorly, the scoring
system may have a disproportionately harsh impact upon large num-
bers of creditworthy applicants.
The public interest in credit scoring systems also derives from the
increased attention Congress has devoted to scoring technology. For
example, in addition to considerations already prohibited, in its 1976
amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Congress extended
its ban on sex and marital status discrimination to also prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of age in any aspect of a credit transaction.
2 6
Congress provided, however, that a creditor did not commit age dis-
crimination if it used "any empirically derived credit system which
considers age if such system is demonstrably and statistically sound in
accordance with regulations of the [Federal Reserve] Board, except that
in the operation of such system the age of an elderly applicant may not
be assigned a negative factor or value."'2 7 This means that while judg-
mental systems of analysis may no longer consider age as a predictor of
creditworthiness, properly constructed scoring systems may continue to
do So.2 8
25. MDS Systems Approach, supra note 7; Executive Summary, supra note 7, at 1.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976). Although a credit scoring system may not consider
the other prohibited bases of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, such as race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, receipt of public assistance, and good-faith exercise of
Consumer Credit Protection Act rights, certain existing systems apparently use the appli-
cant's address as a predictive variable. See text accompanying note 212 infra. This treat-
ment may derive from actual evidence. D. BEEBE, RETAIL CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS 20
(1919) [hereinafter cited as BEEBE]; Myers & Forgy, supra note 14, at 802. Such practices
have understandably given rise to allegations of indirect discrimination and redlining. See
authorities cited note 3 supra; Capon, Credit Ratings and Rights, Washington Post, Dec. 17,
1977, at A19, col. I; Address by Commissioner Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Nat'l. Ass'n of
Women Lawyers Annual Meeting, in Chicago (Aug. 6, 1977), in "C Investigates Big Credit
Card Issuersfor Possible Bias Against Applicants, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 8, 1977, at 11,
col. 2. These charges have resulted, in turn, in the introduction of additional legislation to
further regulate the use of credit scoring systems. H.R. 8451, H.R. 8464, H.R. 8510, H.R.
8580, H.R. 9196, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(3) (1976).
28. Federal Reserve Board Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2) (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation B].
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Private interest in credit scoring
Many business considerations have prompted creditors to adopt
scoring on a large scale. The primary advantage is scoring's more accu-
rate credit decisions through use of the institution's actual credit experi-
ence. Credit scoring avoids limitations of individual remembrance
utilized by judgmental systems by statistically analyzing the institu-
tion's actual experience.29 A computer isolates the various predictive
characteristics and accurately counts the actual repayment experience
associated with each characteristic. This purely analytical methodol-
ogy should reduce the opportunity for human bias and thereby increase
the accuracy of credit analysis.30 A sound scoring system, therefore,
confers the multiple advantages of fair treatment of individual appli-
cants based on actual creditworthiness, improved quality of the credi-
tor's loan portfolio, and increased profitability.
Credit scoring enjoys the second business advantage of providing
the exact probability of repayment associated with a particular score.
A judgmental system requires the credit officer intuitively to estimate
the probability of repayment based upon his or her prior experience.
Credit scoring eliminates this guesswork by comparing the applicant's
characteristics with a sample of the creditor's past applicants with simi-
lar characteristics. Statistical analysis determines the exact percentage
of those applicants who repaid their credit in a satisfactory manner.
Knowledge of the exact probability of repayment permits the creditor's
management to select rationally the degree of risk it wishes to accept
when extending credit.31
29. BANK ADMINISTRATION INsTrruTE, SEvENTH BIENNIAL SuRVEY OF BANK PER-
SONNEL POLICIES AND PRAcncES 6 (1974); Myers & Forgy, supra note 14, at 799. Cf. C.
PHELPS, RETAIL CREDIT FuNDAMENTALs 73 (4th ed. 1963) (credit analysts should give at-
tention to changes in credit conditions) [hereinafter cited as PHELPS]. A judgmental system
uses the memories of its credit officers to synopsize the institution's past experience. If the
officer associates certain attributes with defaulting borrowers, the officer will use this associ-
ation to reject future applicants having those attributes. This method of using the institu-
tion's prior credit experience suffers from the drawback of incomplete or inaccurate human
recollection. The institution's credit officers may turn over rapidly. Experienced credit of-
ficers may be unduly impressed by unusual events, such as defaults, and consequently ex-
clude satisfactory borrowers with identical attributes.
30. G. CHANDLER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEBT POSITIONS OF POVERTY-AREA FAMi-
LIES (National Comm'n on Consumer Finance, Technical Studies, Records Center of the
National Archives and Records Service, 1972); Presby & Simon, Credit Scoring Can Save
Money and Improve Credit Granting Too, STORES, Oct. 1969, at 17.
31. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 2; Johnson, How Point Scoring Can Do More
Than Help Make Loan Decisions, BANKING, Aug. 1971, at 36; Management Tool, supra note
1, at 21.
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Credit scoring also has the advantage of incurring very low operat-
ing costs. A judgmental system requires that skilled credit officers give
extensive personal scrutiny to each application.32 Although scoring en-
tails very high startup costs for development and installation, thereafter
clerical personnel, supported by a high degree of automation, can proc-
ess applications.
33
Scoring may also reduce the cost of credit analysis by reducing the
use of credit bureau reports. The credit report costs the creditor several
dollars, while the creditor already has the "scorable" application in
hand.3
4
For a high volume creditor, the cost of obtaining credit reports
may run into millions of dollars each year. Credit reports serve two
principal functions, confirmation of information disclosed on the appli-
cation and investigation of the applicant's past credit history.35 Credit
scoring requires neither of these functions. Judgmental credit analysis
operates on the theory that certain facts about credit applicants, such as
their income or job status, are positively or negatively correlated with
the probability of repayment on schedule. The credit officer therefore
needs to confirm the veracity of each applicant's statements about these
pertinent elements of creditworthiness. Credit scoring relies upon an
alternative theory, that large populations behave consistently. 36 Ac-
cordingly, a scoring system processes the fact that an applicant says his
income amounts to $18,000, not that the income actually amounts to
32. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, A BIENNIAL SURVEY OF BANK OFFICER SALA-
RIES (1977); NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 141; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1928, ANNUAL EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT PAT-
TERNS OF PRIVATE NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES, 1971 and 1972, at 21 (1976); U.S. BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1875, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK 111, 716 (1976-77 ed. 1976); accord, authorities cited note 4 supra.
33. See Biborsch, Credit Scoring Systems Have Built In Bonuses, BANKERS MONTHLY,
Mar. 1967, at 40; Buel & Lewis, Credit Scoring-and Beyond, BANKING, Feb. 1969, at 42
[hereinafter cited as Buel & Lewis]; Credit Scoring Can Mean Efficiency, CREDIT UNION
MAGAZINE, June 1974, at 39; Executive Summary, supra note 7, at 1; Presby & Simon, Credit
Scoring Can Save Money and Improve Credit Granting Too, STORES, Oct. 1969, at 17; Wein-
gartner, supra note 16.
34. See authorities cited note 38 infra; Hearings on S. 823, infra note 35, at 334; Chan-
dler & Ewert, The Value of Credit Reports Versus Their Costs (1976) (unpublished paper,
Georgia State University); Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 1; Roy, supra note 7, at 27.
35. NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 212; Hearings on S. 823 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 236 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 823].
36. C. MOORE & P. KLEIN, THE QUALITY OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 19, 83
(1967); Weingartner, supra note 20; NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1; Hearings on
S. 823, supra note 35.
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that much. Indeed, some scoring systems score the statements from
credit reports just as they do applications, on the basis of their having
been made rather than their veracity.
37
Credit reports also disclose an applicant's prior credit performance
which theoretically indicates the borrower's willingness to repay.
38
Critics have charged, however, that credit reports frequently prove in-
accurate.39 They may serve as no more than a probable indicator of the
applicant's actual "character." Scoring the application alone can act as
an equally reliable predictor of character. It merely uses the applicant's
statements on the application, rather than the credit bureau's state-
ments about the applicant, as predictors.4° Both sources of information
present potential for inaccuracy. Indeed, the applicant's score, as cal-
culated from the application, may prove a more accurate and less ex-
pensive predictor of character than a credit report. The creditor
understands both the individual score and the scoring system and con-
trols all aspects of their use, whereas the credit report emanates from a
credit bureau whose operations are beyond the control of the creditor.
Scoring has the fourth advantage of giving corporate management
precise control over the amount of credit its officers extend. The rela-
tive attractiveness of consumer credit as an investment varies as interest
rates respond to changes in the economy. By adjusting the cutoff score,
management can increase or decrease the amount of consumer loans in
the creditor's portfolio. Statistical analysis of the institution's past ap-
plicants also provides some advance indication of the exact degree to
which changes in the cutoff score will affect its volume of consumer
credit. Under a judgmental system, when management desires to re-
duce credit volume it can only instruct its credit officers to "tighten up"
credit standards. In a large bank or finance company, the effect of such
instructions will vary from branch to branch. Management cannot fine
tune the credit volume.
Scoring has the final business advantage of providing a mecha-
nism to detect changes in the characteristics which predict creditworthi-
ness and in the composition of the population of creditworthy
applicants. As the economy meanders through its normal business cy-
cles, the composition of a creditor's applicants will alter. New types of
37. See, eg., Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 73.
38. BEEBE, supra note 26, at 77, 109; PHELPS, supra note 29, at 62, 74.
39. PHELPS, supra note 29, at 62. Kocolowski, Equifax Plans to Protest 60 Minutes
Telecast, NAIONAL UNDERWRITER LEFE & HEALTH INsuRN.cE 2 (Mar. 19, 1977).
40. See, ag., Concepts of scoring, supra note 17, at 73; MDS Systems Approach, supra
note 7.
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people move into an area. Local conditions change. Inflation occurs.
As these events transpire, the accuracy of an older scoring system will
eventually decline. When predictive ability declines to unacceptable
levels, the creditor simply undertakes renewed statistical analysis of
more recent applicants and develops a new scoring system which takes
into account changes in the characteristics which predict creditworthi-
ness.4' The predictive ability of a judgmental system can decay too,
but the system does not detect changes as routinely, and there exists no
obvious remedy for its decline.
Scientific principles of credit scoring
Before proceeding with a description of the construction of a scor-
ing system and the statutory constraints on its use, the "scientific" prin-
ciples from which scoring derives should be examined. The following
discussion simplifies the actual nature of the methodology, but seeks to
convey a general grasp of the underlying concepts.
The future will resemble the past
All forms of credit analysis necessarily start with the assumption
that future events will resemble past events. Thus, future creditworthy
applicants will tend to resemble past creditworthy applicants.42 Scor-
ing merely refines the identification of personal characteristics associ-
ated in the past with satisfactory credit risk.4
3
The reader should note two corollaries to this principle. First, the
characteristics used by a scoring system to predict creditworthiness do
not cause creditworthiness.44 The scoring system models the behavior
41. This example inverts the hypothetical posed in Main, supra note 1. A rigorous
study of the creditworthiness of servicemen appears at T. Johnson, An Analysis of Con-
sumer Credit Numerical Scoring Systems and the Effect on Military Servicemen (1973) (un-
published thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School); Johnson, Does Credit Scoring Treat
Servicemen Fairy?, THE CREDIT WORLD, Oct. 1974, at 25. See also text accompanying note
124 infra; Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(iv) (1978); Management Tool, supra note I,
at 24.
42. Roy & Lewis, supra note 7, at 18.
43. The assumption that events, precipitated by human behavior, follow consistent pat-
terns may seem unwarranted. Its validity persists, however, because credit analysis has not
yet developed any superior substitute for past experience as a predictor of future experience.
In addition, this assumption has worked reasonably well, obviating the need to find a substi-
tute. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (paradigm
shift in the sciences occurs suddenly and in response to substantial breakdown of previously
accepted models).
44. Address by William R. Fair, Fair, Isaac Technical Seminar on Credit Scoring
(April 14, 1977); Weingartner, supra note 20; cf. authorities cited note 76 infra.
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of borrowers; it does not analyze the reasons for their behavior. The
system developer determines what characteristics are positively or neg-
atively correlated with prompt repayment, but not why such a correla-
tion occurs. Therefore, many characteristics that may have high
predictability may incidentally create a disproportionate impact on cer-
tain minority groups.45 Statistical methods for investigating causal
forces do exist, but scientists have not yet deployed these techniques in
the credit analysis field.46 Present scoring neither assumes nor investi-
gates the existence of causal linkages.
Second, the assumption that the future will resemble the past does
not require that credit applicants tell the truth.47 It merely requires that
they respond consistently. The system relies upon the applicant's asser-
tion of a certain attribute and scores that attribute's creditworthiness,
rather than relying on the fact that the applicant actually possesses the
asserted attribute, as a predictor.
48
Groups of individuals have predictable behavior
The theories of probability and statistics depend upon the exist-
ence of a large number of similar events for analysis.49 A single event
has little meaning to the statistician.50 However, a series of events per-
45. R. COHEN, THE COLORS OF MAN 52 (1968); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1928, ANNUAL EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF
PRIVATE AND NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES, 1971 AND 1972 (1976). Among Americans,
many physical traits also correlate with race and, therefore, indirectly with financial status.
The list might include hair color, fingerprint patterns, and blood types. N. ROTHWELL,
HUMAN GENETICS 192-94 (1977); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 128, ANNUAL EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF PRIVATE AND NON-
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES, 1971 AND 1972 (1976); Cf. Y. CHOU, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
631 (1969) (suggesting certain limits to causal analysis using statistical techniques).
46. Advanced statistical techniques such as factor analysis and causal analysis can iso-
late the actual causal relationships between statistical variables, but most of the existing
research investigates formation of political attitudes, rather than credit behavior. H. BLA-
LOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 442-50 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as BLALOCK]; D. LAWLEY
& A. MAXWELL, FACTOR ANALYSIS AS A STATISTICAL METHOD (2d ed. 1971).
47. See M. HANSEN, W. Hutwrrz & W. MADow, SAMPLE SURVEY METHODS AND
THEORY 82 (1953).
48. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
49. BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 292, 308; W. HIRSCH, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
STATISTICS 189 (1957).
50. See D. HUFF, How TO LiE WITH STATISTICS 39 (1954). Thus, the statistician has
difficulty making a useful mathematical statement as to whether one roll of a single die will
result in a six. However, the researcher can make predictions about the probability of a six
occurring in ten rolls of the die. Indeed, as the number of successive rolls (events) becomes
larger, a very accurate prediction of the number of sixes which will appear becomes feasible.
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mits numerous conclusions and projections about what will happen "in
the long run."
Accordingly, scoring depends upon the availability of a large
amount of credit experience.51 A group of past applications forms the
development data base. A large volume of new applications assures
frequent future comparisons to the profile compiled from the develop-
ment data base. The system predicts the performance of these new ap-
plicants in the aggregate. The overall credit performance of many new
applicants will approximate that of the data base. Credit granted to
one applicant may or may not result in repayment. Credit granted to
many applicants, however, entails predictable levels of risk. On the av-
erage, the same percentage of these applicants will repay as in the
equivalent portion of the development data base.
That their validity is based on an average does not necessarily
mean that scoring systems must function more impersonally than judg-
mental systems. 52 In fact, scoring treats the applicant just as individu-
ally as a judgmental system. Both approaches to credit analysis
compare the applicant to the mass of past, similarly situated applicants.
The scoring approach tends to have more scientific accoutrements and
therefore gives the impression of treating the applicant as a standard-
ized component. The judgmental system treats the applicant in exactly
the same way, while giving the impression of being more personal.
A set of measurements can distinguish between two groups
The population of credit applicants consists of two nonoverlapping
subpopulations, creditworthy applicants and noncreditworthy appli-
cants. An applicant must belong to one, and only one,53 of these sub-
populations. Accordingly, the creditor has great interest in knowing
51. Professional system developers typically use 2,000 to 5,000 applications as their de-
velopment population. Chandler & Coffman supra note 7, at 14; MDS Systems Approach,
supra note 7; J. Robinson, FICO Position Paper 1-Appropriate Sampling Principles, April
14, 1977 (publication of Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as FICO Position
Paper 1].
52. Buel & Lewis, supra note 33, at 42; New Math, supra note 6, at 5; Roy & Lewis,
Overcoming Obstacles in Using Credit Scoring Systems, THE CREDIT WORLD, June 1970, at
17.
53. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 7; New Math, supra note 6, at 2; see Roy &
Sanderson, supra note 17, at 27.
Any given population may consist of two or more nonoverlapping subpopulations. Ex-
amples of such populations include males and females, left and righthanded people, and
persons with IQs of over 100 and under 100. Each member of the population belongs to one,
and only one, of the subpopulations.
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what characteristics distinguish the two subpopulations. For example,
consider an interval scale characteristic such as the size of a credit ap-
plicant's proposed downpayment.54
Figure 3-Hypothetical frequency distribution
(average separation)
X-Creditworthy applicants
O X O-Noncreditworthy applicants
0 0 X X
. 0 0 X X
' 0 XO X
0 X 0 X
0 X 0 X
size of downpayment
As illustrated in Figure 3, plotting the number of creditworthy and
noncreditworthy applicants at each point of the scale results in afre-
quency distribution.5 5 The frequency distribution indicates the degree
to which this characteristic distinguishes the two subpopulations. If the
overlap is considerable, as in Figure 4, "size of downpayment" does a
Figure 4 - Hypothetical frequency distribution
(poor separation)
X - Creditworthy
0d 4 0 - Noncreditworthy
0 X
0 0 X
C:6. 0 X 0 X00 o x o x
0 X 0 X
0 X 0 X
Characteristic with poor predictive performance
54. An interval scale has a unit of measurement that serves as a common standard for
all possible attributes. Thus, all incomes appear somewhere on an interval scale running
from zero dollars to infinite dollars, and all ages appear on an interval scale of years. The
interval scale contrasts with the nominal scale. A characteristic forming a nominal scale has
several different attribute categories that neither overlap with each other nor share a com-
mon unit of measurement. Thus, the characteristic "marital status" offers only two possible
alternatives, married or unmarried. These attributes, although mutually exclusive, do not
share an underlying unit of measurement. Similarly, the responses to "place of residence"
might include owns, rents, parents, or other. See BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 14.
55. An ordinary frequency distribution counts the number of cases or events (each ap-
plicant, in the case of credit scoring) occurring at each point on an interval scale. It displays
this "frequency count" vertically as a height over each point on the horizontal scale. See
generally BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 41-53.
November 1978] CREDIT SCORING
poor job of predicting credit performance. If, on the other hand, the
overlap is insignificant, the characteristic effectively separates the
subpopulations.
At some points on the scale, the subpopulations do not overlap.
Future applicants whose attributes fall in such nonoverlapping spans
are assigned to the appropriate subpopulation. As the width of no-
noverlapping spans increases, more applicants are correctly classified
and the characteristic better predicts creditworthiness. Even where
overlap does occur, the relative heights of each subpopulation curve at
that point on the frequency distribution still indicates the ratio of
creditworthy to noncreditworthy applicants in the total population. In
distributions of limited overlap, the creditor can therefore use the pre-
dictive characteristic to grant credit to applicants on some overlapping
portions of the frequency distribution because the percentage of non-
creditworthy applicants granted credit remains at predictable and ac-
ceptable levels.
The creditor should clearly prefer to use the available characteris-
tic that maximizes the separation between the two subpopulations.
Credit scoring elaborates on the foregoing principle by relying on com-
binations of distinguishing characteristics to further increase the dis-
tinctiveness of the subpopulations. High income and home ownership
may both indicate creditworthiness on their own frequency distribu-
tions. However, a combination of both attributes may mean extremely
high creditworthiness.
A sophisticated statistical technique known as discriminant analy-
sis refines this intuitive process of combining several predictive charac-
teristics.56 Basically, it subjects creditworthiness data to mathematical
calculations in order to assemble an index of creditworthiness. 57 This
56. B. BLOCH & C. HUANO, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS FOR BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS 229 (1974). See generally W. COOLEY & P. LoHNES, MULTIVARIATE DATA
ANALYSIS (1971); W. COOLEY & P. LOHNES, MULTIVARIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCES (1962); R. EISENBEIS & R. AVERY, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND CLASSI-
FICATION PROCEDURES (1972); P. LACHENBRUCH, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (1975); D.
MORRISON, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS 221-56 (1967). The scoring formula de-
rives from a linear discriminant function of the form:
Z = L1 X1 + L2X2+ L3 X3 +. .. + LpXp
where X represents the characteristics available to distinguish the subpopulations and L
represents the linear coefficient that maximizes the subpopulations' divergence. Fisher, The
Use of Mult#ile Measurements in Taxonomic Problems, 7 ANNALS OF EUGENICS 179 (1936);
Fisher, The Statistical Utilization ofMultiple Measurements, 8 ANNALS OF EUGENICS 376
(1938).
57. Chaterjee & Barcum, .4 Nonparametric Approach to Credit Screening, 65 AM. STAT.
ASSN. J. 150 (1970); see DURAND, supra note 6, at 22-28; Myers & Forgy, supra note 14, at
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index includes the available characteristics that, taken together, best
predict creditworthiness. Discriminant analysis not only selects these
characteristics but also takes into account the scaling of their attributes
and weighs each characteristic so as to express properly its relative con-
tribution to the final index of creditworthiness. Plotting the subpopula-
tions over the index produces a frequency distribution with minimum
overlap with respect to the data available.
Figure 5-Hypothetical frequency distribution
(excellent separation)
0 X
number of o o X X
applicants b 0 X X
0 X 0 X
Index of creditworthiness
The characteristics that distinguish best are incorporated into the
index and will appear on the scoring sheet. An applicant's place on the
index is determined by the total score. Charting the scores and per-
formance of a sample of applicants results in a frequency distribution
similar to that produced in Figure 5 for a single-interval characteristic.
Because the horizontal axis58 graphs the combined effect of several
characteristics, instead of a single predictive characteristic, the sub-
populations overlap less. The user can therefore make more accurate
predictions about the subpopulation to which a new applicant belongs.
System Construction
As a prerequisite to the full comprehension of how the law affects
credit scoring, the reader must understand the technical construction,
operation, and nature of scoring systems. This section therefore at-
tempts to describe how a developer goes about building a typical scor-
ing system. This discussion is designed only to familiarize the reader
803; Weingartner, supra note 16. A trial system's ability to separate the creditworthy and
noncreditworthy subpopulations is measured by the formula:
(Uc - Un) 2
1/2 (Dc2 + Dn2 )
where Uc represents the mean score of the creditworthy subpopulation, Un represents the mean
score of the noncreditworthy subpopulation, Dc represents standard deviation of the creditworthy
subpopulation and Dn represents the standard deviation of the noncreditworthy subpopulation.
58. The horizontal axis is also called the X axis, the abscissa, or the independent axis in
a plane Cartesian coordinate system. Other names for the vertical axis include the Y axis,
ordinate, and dependent axis.
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with the nomenclature and processes of system development. Other
procedures for system construction exist besides the one described
here.59 However, most professional developers generally use the fol-
lowing model.60
Defintion of system scope
The creditor first decides upon the coverage of the system,
6'
namely, what applicants it will process. Some nationwide creditors use
a single system for the entire country. Others use a different system for
each branch or store. Other systems process only applicants under age
twenty-five from the Midwest. Full service creditors offering a variety
of credit plans may use scoring for some plans but not for others.
The choice of system scope depends principally upon the nature of
59. For example, with a large enough sample, the developer could simply divide the
applicant population along arbitrarily selected characteristics and attributes. Each of the
thousands of cells of this multidimensional matrix would have a repayment rate calculated
on the basis of the applicants falling into that cell. The creditor would select the overall
repayment rate it found acceptable and the developer would use this cutoff rate to designate
all cells as either acceptable or unacceptable. An incoming application would be assigned to
one of the cells in the matrix according to its respective attributes. The cell's designation
would determine whether the creditor approved the request. However, compiling enough
data to compute a reliable repayment rate for each of the thousand-odd cells would entail a
development sample having more than a million cases. Logistical and cost considerations
preclude such a mathematically inefficient approach to system construction.
More realistically, one professional developer uses a technique known as dynamic pro-
gramming to construct its scoring systems, instead of the more conventional combination of
regression analysis and discriminant analysis described above. Dynamic programming
solves the problem of analyzing multiple relationships by dividing the problem into "deci-
sion stages," working backwards from the stated objectives, solving the simplest stages first,
and assembling the individual stages into a complete system only after independently solv-
ing all of the intermediate stages. Mathtech, MATHSCORE-A Computer System for Nu-
merical Credit Scoring (Nov. 15, 1977) (publication of Mathtech, Princeton Station Office
Park, P.O. Box 2392, Princeton NJ 08540) [hereinafter cited as MATHSCORE]; Mathtech,
Mathscore Weight Development Algorithms (Oct. 1, 1977) (publication of Mathtech,
Princeton Station Office Park, P.O. Box 2392, Princeton, NJ 08540); Interview with Richard
D. Koelsch, Director of Business Services, Mathtech, Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5,
1978); cf. F. HILLIER & G. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS RESEARCH 248-79
(2d ed. 1974).
60. This discussion will not enable the reader to rush out and immediately develop a
scoring sheet and repayment table. Indeed, very few creditors have the staff expertise to
develop their own scoring systems. Instead, they usually hire outside consultants to examine
their files and assemble the credit information into one or more scoring systems. Surpris-
ingly, few businesses offer system development services. Only half a dozen such consultants
have come to the author's attention.
61. G. deKerchove, FICO Position Paper 2-Creditor's Business Judgment 2, Apr. 14,




the creditor's business. Although a system requires, at least, several
thousand applications as a data base,62 too inclusive a development
population may result in unnecessary loss of predictive power. The
creditor, using a single system for the whole country, may find itself
unable to extend any credit in Florida because of the unusual demo-
graphic composition of the state's population. The creditor exercises
business judgment, rather than scientific doctrine, when selecting
whom the system will cover.
6 3
Classification of accounts
The creditor then defines what it considers a satisfactory account
and an unsatisfactory account.64 Using hindsight, it classifies past bor-
rowers as creditworthy or noncreditworthy.6 5 This definition estab-
lishes a nominal scale for the characteristic creditworthiness. This
classification process serves as the starting point from which the two
subpopulations which the creditor wishes to separate will derive.
Sampling
The initiative now passes to the system developer, who uses the
creditor's records to draw samples of satisfactory and unsatisfactory ac-
counts and rejected applicants. Each of these three samples will, if
properly drawn, statistically represent the characteristics of the under-
lying applicant population in an unbiased fashion.66 Selection of ap-
propriate sampling techniques comprises a specialized and arcane
subject.6 7 Accordingly, this subsection can mention only a few sam-
62. See note 51 & accompanying text supra.
63. Churchill, Nevin & Watson, Credit Scoring-How Many Systems Do We Need?,
THE CREDIT WORLD, Nov. 1977, at 6; see text accompanying note 217 infra.
64. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 7; New Math, supra note 6, at 2; FICO
Position Paper 2, supra note 61, at I; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. III, supra note 9; Roy,
supra note 7, at 56-58.
65. FICO Interview, supra note 7. A scientific analysis of the misclassification problem
appears at Eisenbeis, Pitfalls in the Application of Discriminant Analysis in Business, Finance,
and Economics, 32 J. FINANcE 875, 887-93 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Piyalls]; Eisenbeis,
Problems in Applying Discriminant Analysis to Credit Scoring Models, at 17 (Oct. 14, 1977)
(Federal Reserve Board staff study No. 94, summarized in 64 FED. REs. BULL. 13 (1978))
[hereinafter cited as Eisenbeis].
66. See generally F. CRoxToN, D. COWDEN & S. KLEIN, APPLIED GENERAL STATIS-
ncs 6-7 (3d ed. 1967); W. HIRSCH, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN STATISTICS 111-24 (1957);
B. OsTLE & R. MENSING, STATISTICS IN RESEARCH 44 (3d ed. 1975).
67. See generally W. DEMING, SAMPLE DESIGN IN BusmEss RESEARCH (1960); W.
DEMING, SOME THEORY OF SAMPLING (1950); M. HANSEN, W. HuRwrrz & W. MADow,
SAMPLE SURVEY METHODS AND THEORY (1953); W. HENDRICKS, THE MATHEMATICAL
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pling issues of particular interest to scoring system development.
Most creditors have far more satisfactory accounts than they have
unsatisfactory accounts.68 A normal, random sample therefore cannot
fully represent the attributes of the subpopulation of unsatisfactory ac-
counts without pulling far more satisfactory accounts than necessary.
Thus, most developers elect to use stratified sampling, a technique
which draws an equal number of cases from each of several subpopula-
tions of disproportionate size.69 This technique gives a more efficient
representation of the attributes of the smaller subpopulation.70 Thus,
the developer might select equal samples of 1,000 cases each from une-
qual subpopulations of 7,000 satisfactory borrowers, 1,000 unsatisfac-
tory borrowers, and 2,500 rejected applicants.
In addition, sampling of existing accounts does not give proper
consideration to the attributes of rejected applicants.71 The scoring sys-
tem must model the population consisting of all the creditor's appli-
cants, not merely the creditor's borrowers. To do otherwise would
predict the performance of only part of the population, whose attrib-
utes may differ greatly from those of the overall population it will proc-
ess. Methods for integrating rejected applicants into the borrower
population will receive further treatment below.
72
A proper development sample also requires that its accounts have
sufficient "age." Like any other product, credit accounts have life-
cycles. A closed-end account73 goes through a sequence of steps: appli-
THEORY OF SAMPLING (1956); P. JOHNSON & M. RAO, MODERN SAMPLING METHODS
(1959).
68. See J. CHAPMAN, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 102
(Financial Research Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in
Consumer Instalment Financing No. 3, 1940); W. PLUMMER & R. YOUNG, SALES FINANCE
COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 121-28 (Financial Research Program of the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Consumer Instalment Financing No. 2,
1940).
69. FICO Position Paper 1, supra note 51; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. III, supra note
7.
70. See generally G. YULE & M. KENDALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
STATISTICS 383 (14th ed. 1950); J. FREUND & F. WILLIAMS, ELEMENTARY BUSINESS STATIS-
TICS 416 (2d ed. 1972).
71. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 9; Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 15;
MDS Systems Approach, Sec. III, supra note 7; MATHSCORE, supra note 59.
72. See note 78 & accompanying text infra.
73. Such an account is merely an obligation to pay off the outstanding balance and
does not entitle the consumer to additional credit. The closed-end account contrasts with an
open-end account, such as a credit card or check overdraft program, that permits the con-
sumer to obtain more credit and to repay the balance in full or in installments. 15 U.S.C. §
1602(i) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(x) (1977).
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cation, credit analysis, approval, disbursement of proceeds, a series of
repayments by the borrower, possible default, and eventual full pay-
ment or writeoff. A creditor's portfolio consists of many accounts in
different stages of their lifecycles. In order to compare the attributes of
satisfactory, as opposed to unsatisfactory borrowers, the accounts used
in the development sample must have had the opportunity to develop
both default and repayment experience.74 A sample of new accounts
imparts no credit information because none of the borrowers has yet
had time to default. Frequently, only accounts opened several years
previously have accumulated sufficient unsatisfactory experience to be-
come useful to the developer. The accepted and rejected applications
in the sample must have occurred at about the same time in order to
permit meaningful comparisons. 75 This need for vintage accounts also
implies a constant gap between the attributes and performance of cur-
rent applicants and of the development sample.
Coding
The developer next utilizes every available, pertinent item of in-
formation about each individual in the three samples drawn as de-
scribed above.76 The creditor's loan files and payment records
constitute the developer's main source of applicant information. The
loan file may include the original application, verifying information,
credit reports, the loan officer's personal evaluation, cash flow analysis,
appraisals, approval sheets, the contract, disclosure statements, and col-
lection materials. Payment records, however, frequently exist only on a
computer. After determining the extent of available information, the
developer designs a coding scheme for transcribing all information into
74. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 14; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. I, pt. 3,
supra note 7.
75. Cf. BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 510-12 (certain deficiencies also exist in noncurrent
data). However, some developers attempt to improve the quality of the "aged" development
sample by adjusting it to better represent the attributes of more recent applicants. This
approach assumes that while only older accounts have sufficient credit experience to permit
their classification as creditworthy or noncreditworthy, a sample composed of such accounts
fails to allow for changes in the demographic, financial, and creditworthiness makeup of
more recent applicants. Accordingly, this latter approach draws two sets of samples, one of
aged accounts having credit experience and one of recent applicants. It then compares the
attributes of each set of samples and uses quantitative techniques to reweight the "aged"
sample to conform to the composition of the recent applicant samples. Thus, if the new
sample shows more car owners than the "aged" sample, those few car owners in the "aged"
sample will receive more weight in the final development sample.
76. See Chandler & Coffinan, supra note 7, at 13; Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17,
at 21; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. I, pt. 3, supra note 7.
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computer-usable form. After conversion to machine-readable format,
the data go into the computer and its electronic manipulation com-
mences. These data typically consist of several hundred attributes for
each of several thousand applicants.
Attribute classing
The computer's first task consists of deciding how to divide each
characteristic having an interval scale into attribute cells. Recall that
attributes may form either nominal or interval scales.77 Nominal scales
usually convert readily into attribute cells on a scoring sheet. For a
characteristic such as checking account, the responses yes and no com-
prise all of the possible answers. An interval scale, however, imposes
no special limits on the number or width of the attribute cells of the
interval characteristic. Whether the first cell should span 0-6 months or
0-8 months depends instead on the particular data base.
At this point in the development process, the data for an interval
characteristic exists in the computer's memory in exactly the form in
which the applicant submitted it to the creditor. No rounding, refining,
or condensing of the numbers has occurred. Thus, income might ap-
pear in one dollar increments, or years on job by one month intervals.




Ratio of sat- XXXXX
isfactory to X





Number of affirmative credit references
In order to make the attributes more comprehensible and more
susceptible to statistical manipulation, the ideal development process
converts the repayment-rate curve into a series of fixed steps over the
characteristic's interval as illustrated in Figure 6. When the repayment
rate remains stable over a range of attribute values, this span is col-
lapsed into a single attribute cell, as in Figure 7.
77. See note 54 supra.
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X X X X
XXXXXX X X X
repayment X X X X X
rate X X X X X
X X X X X
XXXX X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X
Number of affirmative credit references
This conversion process largely defines the perimeters of the attri-
bute cells that will comprise the scoring sheet's columns. Note that the
final attributes selected by the computer's conversion of raw data can
span irregular intervals. The characteristic "number of credit refer-
ences" might have the following attributes: 0, 1-2, 3-5, 6-12, 13-17, 17-
19, over 19, depending upon the data's actual plateaus. Nominal scale
attributes also are assigned to common cells where they exhibit similar
repayment rates.
Rejects
As described above, a scoring system models the behavior of the
population consisting of all a creditor's applicants.78 It seeks to divide
the applicant population into two, nonoverlapping subpopulations,
creditworthy applicants and noncreditworthy applicants. By identify-
ing the attributes which distinguish the subpopulations, the system can
properly classify future applicants of unknown creditworthiness with a
high degree of accuracy.
However, the creditor's records do not fully characterize all its ap-
plicants as either creditworthy or noncreditworthy on the basis of expe-
rience. Some applicants are rejected. Because the creditor grants no
credit to rejected applicants, it does not generate any default or repay-
ment experience for them. It cannot automatically classify them in ei-
ther subpopulation.
The mathematics of discriminant analysis evaluates the separation
of only two subpopulations. The next step in system development,
therefore, consists of collapsing three sample groups into two develop-
78. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. However, certain special systems inten-
tionally analyze the quality of loans only after the approval and disbursement. See Orgler,
uupra note 19.
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ment subpopulations: satisfactory accounts (creditworthy applicants),
unsatisfactory accounts (noncreditworthy applicants), and rejects
(creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants).
In the actual development process reclassification of rejects occurs
prior to selection of predictive characteristics and calculation of scores.
Various methods of accounting for rejected applicants exist.
Do nothing
The developer may ignore the presence of rejects. This method
assumes that the attributes of the accepted population largely represent
those of the applicant population.
79
This approach suffers from the potentially faulty assumption that
past credit analysis resulted in random acceptances, whereas rejected
applicants usually have lower quality economic and social attributes.
Otherwise, the judgmental creditor would not have rejected them in the
first place. Accordingly, the accepted population usually has consider-
ably different attributes from the applicant population. Failure to al-
low for the rejects results in a development sample which measures
only the better quality applicants.
Assume rejects are noncreditworthy
The developer may assume that all rejects would have defaulted
and are therefore noncreditworthy. 80 This method justifies its deroga-
tory treatment of rejects by focusing upon their relatively low economic
attributes.
Other analyses of rejects do not, however, confirm this presump-
tion.81 While the repayment rate may decline as attribute quality de-
clines, the rate never reaches zero. Although the repayment rate among
rejects may become too low for profitability, it still includes a high per-
centage of creditworthy applicants. The creditor rejects these appli-
cants only because it lacks a practical means for distinguishing them
from the balance of the noncreditworthy subpopulation. 82
79. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
80. The author is not acquainted with any professional developers who use this
approach.
81. This would mean that the existing mode of credit analysis, usually the human judg-
ment of a credit officer, would have almost perfect accuracy. This system would reject only
noncreditworthy applicants and accept all the creditworthy applicants along with a few non-
creditworthy ones. Any system performing this well certainly does not need replacement.
82. The repayment probability table mentioned in Section III, part N, for example,
illustrates that credit standards tend to be imperfect. Tightening the standards can change
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The assignment of all rejects to the noncreditworthy category
therefore misclassifies many rejected applicants. This error means that
the two subpopulations used to develop the scoring system will not ac-
curately reflect the attributes of the true underlying subpopulations of
creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants. The predictive power of
the final system will suffer because of the numerous classification er-
rors caused by this approach.
Buy experience
A third and perhaps best way of measuring the total applicant
population involves an actual check of the creditworthiness of the
"through the door" population. 83 The creditor may approve all incom-
ing applications, up to a certain number regardless of the information
disclosed by the applicant. It then studies the borrowers' performance.
This method makes the accepted population identical to the applicant
population. With no rejects, the satisfactory and unsatisfactory ac-
counts, respectively, automatically become the sole source of informa-
tion about creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants.
Obviously, economic factors constrain the use of this method of
gleaning information about rejects. Presumably the default rate rises
considerably in the complete absence of any credit analysis. The credi-
tor purchases credit experience with higher loan losses. The creditor
can to some extent control unnecessary losses by randomly granting
credit to only a sample of current applicants or by strictly limiting the
time period over which it grants credit to all applicants. However, the
creditor should avoid scrutinizing the unanalyzed slow loans with spe-
cial care or resorting to special collection efforts because this would
produce abnormal data about the default rate.
Use old credit reports
A creditor's application files frequently include a credit report,84
the ratio of satisfactory to unsatisfactory accounts, but can result in the rejection of all unsat-
isfactory accounts only in the extreme case in which it declines virtually all applications.
This observation equally applies to judgmental analysis. Raising the required income from
$12,000 to $14,000 and increasing the quality of the required credit references will reject
proportionately more noncreditworthy applicants, but will also reject large numbers of
creditworthy applicants.
83. See text accompanying notes 5-15 supra.
84. BEEBE, supra note 26, at 80; R. COLE, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDr MAN-
AGEMENT 275 (5th ed. 1976). See generally PHELPS, supra note 29, at 63-69.
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obtained at the time of the credit request which summarizes the appli-
cant's past credit experience. 85 Using the general credit analysis
assumption that future behavior will resemble past behavior, the devel-
oper assigns rejects to the creditworthy or noncreditworthy subpopula-
tion on the basis of the credit report.
86
This procedure has the advantage of low cost, but it has the disad-
vantage of not reacting to subsequent changes in applicant
creditworthiness. The scoring system seeks to separate applicants on
the basis of their performance after the credit request, not before. The
main advantage of using "aged" accounts lies in knowing their actual,
rather than estimated, credit performance. 87 Estimates based on out-
dated credit reports, however, increase the unreliability of the samples.
In addition, an applicant's credit performance may vary from creditor
to creditor, and a creditor very well may have reports on only a few of
the total rejects if the creditor has relied on scoring.
Use new credit reports
A similar method of determining the performance of rejects uses
new credit reports.88 This approach assumes that the rejected applicant
eventually obtained credit from some other source and that a current
credit report will reflect the history of the substitute credit. The devel-
oper can thereby determine which rejected applicants warrant classifi-
cation as creditworthy in the development sample.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act89 presents a potential obstacle to
the use of this technique for assigning rejects. The Act provides that a
consumer reporting agency (a credit bureau) may supply a consumer
report only for a "permissible purpose" and enumerates the uses that
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1976).
86. This process increases the opportunity for errors in classification. The conse-
quences of such misclassification can include development of an inaccurate scoring formula.
See generally R. EISENBEIS & R. AVERY, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
PROCEDURES (1972); Piffalls, supra note 65, at 893.
87. Creditors frequently have considerable difficulty classifying accounts as satisfac-
tory or unsatisfactory even when they have complete information about account perform-
ance. See note 65 & accompanying text supra. However, most credit reports are even less
helpful in classifying applicants.
88. The creditor obtains an updated credit report on everyone in the development sam-
ple and classifies each person as satisfactory or unsatisfactory on the basis of this report.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976).
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constitute permissible purposes.90 These do not include construction of
scoring systems.
Augmentation
Most professional developers of scoring systems use an augmenta-
tion technique to account for the attributes of rejects.91 This approach
capitalizes on the ability of discriminant analysis to separate any two
subpopulations by using a composite of predictive characteristics. In
credit scoring the developer wants to distinguish between creditworthy
and noncreditworthy applicants,92 and does so by selecting characteris-
tics and weighting their attributes so as to maximize the divergence be-
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accept/reject score
For augmentation, the developer uses different subpopulations.93
Accordingly, a scoring system which differentiates between accepted
and rejected applicants instead of creditworthy and noncreditworthy
applicants is developed. To construct this system, the developer uses
the same selection and weighting techniques he will use for the final
scoring system. A scoring sheet and odds table, similar to the one in
Figure 8, results.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).
91. See, eg., Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7; Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at
14; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. II, pt. 4.b, supra note 7; MATHSCORE, supra note 59.
92. See text accompanying note 4 supra; see Roy, Using Computer-Based Control Sys-
temsfor Decision Making, S.A.M. ADVANCED MANAGEMENT J. 37, 39 (Jan. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Control Systems].
93. Discriminant analysis can process any data consisting of two discrete subpopula-
tions that do not overlap and that have distinguishing characteristics. The seminal work on
discriminant analysis involved classification of flowers into different species using measure-
ments of their stems and leaves as indicators. Fisher, The Use of Multiple Measurements in
Taxonomic Problems, 7 ANNALS OF EUGENICS 179 (1936). The same statistical methodol-
ogy can develop formulas for good and bad commercial loans, recidivist and nonrecidivist
parolees, evaders and nonevaders among taxpayers, or successful and unsuccessful students
or employees. D. MoRIusoN, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS 230 (1967).
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This augmentation system models the behavior of the creditor
rather than that of its applicants. By comparing the heights of the two
normal curves at any point along the accept/reject score line, the devel-
oper knows the probability of the creditor accepting an application at-
taining that score. The computer reweights the accepted applications at
each score to account for the probability of their acceptance.94 Thus,
for example, where the curves intersect, each accepted application
counts double to allow for an equal number of rejected applications.
The developer has creditworthiness information about the
reweighted accepted applications. By using the reweighted sample in
system development calculations, the accepted applications indirectly
represent the attributes of all applicants. After this threshold screening,
the accept/reject scoring system has no further function in the develop-
ment of the final scoring system.
95
First characteristic selection
The process next selects the single characteristic that gives the
most information about creditworthiness. 96 It does this by performing
a statistical test that expresses a characteristic's predictive power as a
single figure. 97 The higher the figure, the better its predictive power
(i.e. it correctly classifies more creditworthy and noncreditworthy ac-
counts). The characteristic with the highest figure, out of the hundreds
of available characteristics, becomes the scoring sheet's first
characteristic.
First score calculation
Having mathematically selected the single most useful characteris-
tic, the process next sets the scores for each attribute of that characteris-
tic. Because a one characteristic system does not have to account for
the correlation effect of any other characteristics, the developer simply
94. See authorities cited note 91 supra; Roy & Sanderson, supra note 17.
95. More sophisticated statistical techniques that can achieve an accepted population
representative of the whole applicant population are not described here because of their
advanced, and sometimes proprietary nature. See Pitfalls, supra note 65, at 894.
96. See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7, at 16; Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17,
at 44; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. III, pt. 4, supra note 17.
97. This is typically accomplished by the Chi-square, Kendall's Tau, or Phi tests. Each
of these measures the association between nominal scale variables, but in slightly different
ways. See BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 275-77, 295-98, 418-26.
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calculates the ratio of creditworthy to noncreditworthy applicants for
each attribute, while controlling for the relative sample sizes. The com-
putation may also logarithmically rescale this ratio to convert a multi-
plication process into an addition process.
Second characteristic selection
The developer next selects the second characteristic by pairing the
first characteristic selected as described above, with each of the remain-
ing characteristics in the data base.98 Each two-characteristic combina-
tion forms a primitive index of creditworthiness having an interval
scale. The machine therefore calculates the overall predictive power of
each two-characteristic combination. This calculation allows for corre-
lation between the several variables. For example, age and income
may each predict creditworthiness independently, but may function
poorly as a two-characteristic system because older people have higher
incomes. Each characteristic tends to measure the same subgroup of
creditworthy applicants and therefore adds little useful information to
the other's predictions. The process selects as the second characteristic
of the final scoring system, the characteristic that adds the most margi-
nal improvement to the system's predictive ability.99
Second score calculation
Having selected the second most predictive characteristic, the de-
veloper next derives the scores to be assigned to each attribute of that
characteristic. 10 For example, suppose that the process has selected
"time at address" as the first characteristic, calculated its attributes and
trial scores, and selected "size of monthly car payment" as having the
next most predictive information in relation to time at address. Sup-
pose this characteristic has four attributes, no car, under $80, $80-100,
over $100, derived as suggested. The process must still determine how
many points each attribute should receive.
Developers use several methods to make this assignment. The
most conventional approach calculates the points for the second and
subsequent characteristics from the results of the multivariate, statisti-
cal routines. Another approach uses an iterative, trial and error proce-
98. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 48; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. m, pt.
4.D, supra note 17.
99. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 50; Control Systems, supra note 92, at 57, 59.
100. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
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dure, sometimes called a "guided direct search," to derive the optimal
assignment of points experimentally.101
Subsequent characteristic selection and score calculation
The computer keeps repeating the process detailed in the preced-
101. Under the latter procedure, the computer sets each attribute's score at zero as illus-
trated in Figure A.
Figure A-Hypothetical initiation of score calculation
characteristics monthly car payment
attributes
scores
none $1-79 $80-100 $101+
.00 .00 .00 .00
The computer then increases and decreases the first attribute's score slightly, perhaps to .01
and -.01. It calculates the subpopulation separation for each combination of attribute scores.
The combinations having poorer separatory power are thrown out.
Figure B-Hypothetical results of first pass
none 1-79 80-100 100+
.01 .00 .00 .00
Holding the results of the first pass constant, the machine repeats this process in turn for
each succeeding attribute cell. It changes the zero score in the cell slightly, compares the
separatory power of each combination, and retains the best predictor.
Figure C-Hypothetical results of first cycle
01 -01l .00.0
After doing this once for each attribute cell, the machine has completed a cycle. The
attribute scores span the range .01 to -.01 in the combination that maximizes the separation
of the creditworthy and noncreditworthy subpopulations. The machine then performs a sec-
ond cycle. It changes the first cycle scores slightly, testing successive combinations for pre-
dictive ability, and retaining the superior combination.
Figure D-Hypothetical results of second cycle
.01 -. 02 -. 01 .02
This incrementation process continues for cycle after cycle. During this process scores
rise and fall. Eventually the process reaches a point at which marginal changes in the attri-
bute scores do not change the overall separation of the two subpopulations of interest, thus
completing the trial score calculation for the second characteristic.
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ig subsections, 0 2 retaining those characteristics already selected and
sequentially assembling these characteristics into trial systems in com-
bination with each of the remaining characteristics in the data base.
Note that the trial scores assigned to the characteristics retained from
previous steps may change under the influence of characteristics subse-
quently added to the system.
Eventually, this process reaches the data's reliability limit. 0 3
Figure E-hypothetical conclusion of score calculation
monthly car payment
none $1-79 $80-100 $101+




number of 0 0 X X-creditworthy
applicants 0 X 0 X 0- noncreditworthy
0 X 0 X
score
This process also uses statistical tests that express a two (or more) characteristic system's
predictive power as a single number. This time, however, the process employs tests that
allow for the intercorrelation between the predictive characteristics. Thus, income and years
of education might independently predict creditworthiness. However, if most applicants
with high income also have many years of education, and vice-versa, then using both char-
acteristics will not improve on the predictions made by using only one of them. Multivariate
statistics constitutes a complex and esoteric field of scholarship. See generally BLALOCK,
supra note 66, at 429-70; W. COOLEY & P. LOHNEs, MULTIVARIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1962); N. DRAPER & H. SMITH, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS
(1966); M. EZEKIEL & K. Fox, METHODS OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS (3d
ed. 1959); J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC METHODS (2d ed. 1972); F. KERLINGER & E.
PEDHAZER, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1973); S. Roy, SOME AS-
PECTS OF MULTivARIATE ANALYSIS (1957); J. VAN DE GEER, INTRODUCTION TO MUL-
TivARIATE ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1971); Chandler & Coffman, supra note 7,
at 17.
102. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 58. The developer sometimes artificially
restricts certain perimeters of the guided direct search process. For example, the developer
might specify that no single score may contribute more than 25% to the total score in order
to prevent a single characteristic from dominating the final system, regardless of its power as
a predictor of creditworthiness. Alternately, the development process might use the credit
report only as a last resort because the creditor must pay for the credit report, whereas the
information from the application costs nothing. Statisticians have not yet decided whether
such constraints can affect the scientific validity of the final system.
103. This statement is true at least for a process using either a guided direct search or
dynamic programming. Developers do not presently know whether reliability limit can
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Neither adding more characteristics nor adjusting the trial scores will
produce more subpopulation separation. At this point the system typi-
cally consists of some six to twelve characteristics. The degree of sepa-
ration of the two subpopulations at this point corresponds to the
system's final predictive ability.
Score transformation
In the preceding calculation using the iterative approach, scores
arbitrarily spanned a limited range.""4 Summing small numbers while
keeping track of signs and decimal points presents considerable oppor-
tunity for arithmetic error. Therefore, the developer makes an alge-
braic transformation of the calculated scores. This process does not
affect the relative relationship of the scores or the total separation con-
ferred by their numerical values. It merely changes the scores in the
cells to convenient whole numbers. Essentially, the final scoring sheet
results from this transformation.10 5
Validation
Both scientific principles and federal laws compel the developer's
next step, which is system validation.' °6 All statistical analysis assumes
a small but finite probability of error. Frequently, this error results
from the ill fortune of drawing a skewed sample for use in develop-
ment, or from sloppy data-transcription procedures which result in
classification errors with respect to some attributes. 0 7 As a result of
form a "local maximum." Conceivably, instead of starting with all scores at 0.00 or some
other arbitrarily chosen value, a completely different starting configuration could produce a
completely different scoring system that has greater predictive power. This as of yet uniden-
tified starting point would presumably lead to a "true maximum," using the same raw data.
However, statisticians presently know no way of verifying the existence of the true maxi-
mum, other than by measuring the predictive power of every possible combination of char-
acteristics, attributes, and scores. Such an undertaking would present substantial logistical
problems and would strain the limited reliability of a data base having only a few thousand
cases. In addition, no particular evidence indicates that existing search techniques have yet
proven inadequate from a practical and business standpoint.
104. The range spanned depends upon the constants used by the score calculation al-
gorithm. With slight changes in computation limits, the calculation could span -I to +1,
-100 to +100, or 0 to 1000.
105. Eg., Figure 1 supra; deKerchove, Reject Reasons and Scoring, VIEWPOINTS, Winter
1977, at 3; Main, supra note 1; A Simplified Look at Credit Scoring, CONSUMER MONTH,
May 1977, at 4.
106. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(iii) (1978); C. Abrahams, FICO Position Pa-
per 3-A Statistical Assessment of Model Performance Upon Validation, Apr. 14, 1977 (pub-
lication of Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc.).
107. See W. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 359 (3d ed. 1977); Blumenfeld, Godbey
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such errors, the development sample would not fully represent the at-
tributes of the underlying population of applicants when taken as
whole. A scoring system developed by means of an erroneous sample
would do a poorer than expected job of predicting creditworthiness.
Therefore, the developer must validate the system to estimate its future
error rate prior to its actual use for credit evaluation.
Numerous methods exist for assessing the performance of systems.
The simplest approach involves taking the original development sam-
ple, running it through the proposed system, and observing whether it
predicts as well as expected.'08 This method has the drawback of pro-
ducing unduly optimistic predictions of the system's future perform-
ance because the biased validation data still does not reflect the
attributes of the true population.
Accordingly, most developers validate by means of a "holdout
sample."'' 09 After drawing the original development sample, the devel-
oper "holds out" about a third of the cases and does not use them in
system development. The holdout sample therefore has an independ-
ent opportunity to represent the actual population of applicants. The
system processes the new data from the holdout sample and the devel-
oper compares its creditworthiness prediction with the holdout appli-
cant's actual performance in order to obtain an independent estimate of
the system's validity. 0
Compilation of the repayment probability table
Prior to the initial use of the system, the developer will compile its
other component, the repayment-probability table. The developer
reweights the development sample to represent the applicant popula-
tion's actual ratio of creditworthy to noncreditworthy persons. The sys-
& Blumenfeld, Application of a New Psychometric Method to an Old Tried and Untrue
Experimental Design to Improve the Validity of a Tailor-Made Scoring Key (Feb. 1973)
(paper presented at the American Personnel and Guidance Ass'n Meeting, San Diego, Cal.);
Blumenfeld, Quasi-Successful Concurrent Validation of a Special Key for a Relatively New
and Exciting Personality Instrument in a Group of Potential Managers: or I Am Never Star-
tled By A Fish (paper read at meeting of the Georgia Psychological Ass'n, Macon, May
1972) reprintedin THn AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N MoNrroR 3 (1972). See generally,
Pitfalls, su.pra note 65, at 893.
108. See Frank, Massy & Morrison, Bias in Multiole Discriminant Analysir, 2 J. MAR-
KETING RESEARCH 250 (1965).
109. See Chandler & Coffmian, supra note 7, at 25; MDS Systems Approach, Sec. III, pt.
4.d(3)(b), supra note 7; cf. Lachenbruch & Mickey, Estimation fError Rates in Discriminant
Analysis, 10 TECHNOMETRICS 1 (1968) (alternative means for determining error rates).
110. Other error-estimation methods exist but are rarely used to validate scoring sys-
tems. See generally Pitfalls, supra note 65, at 894.
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tem processes the reweighted sample to calculate a score for each
applicant. The computer counts the number of creditworthy and non-
creditworthy applicants attaining each score and calculates the percent-
age of applicants who repaid at each score.'
By cumulating the number of creditworthy and noncreditworthy
applicants at or above a certain score, the developer can calculate the
overall repayment rate for that cutoff level. This percentage expresses
the quality of the loan portfolio and estimates the number of applica-
tions accepted. Conversely, cumulation by ascending score describes
the number of applications not accepted and the projected repayment
rate among the rejects.
Theoretically, the creditor uses the repayment-probability table to
set its cutoff score. 1 2 By setting it high, the creditor obtains a small,
but quality, loan portfolio. If it lowers the cutoff, the marginal default
rate increases, but so does the portfolio's size. The profitability tradeoff
between volume and quality will vary from creditor to creditor. Ide-
ally, the creditor balances the cost of a default against the profit on a
repayment, and sets the cutoff score at the marginal profitability
rate.1 3 In practice, creditors rarely know the breakdown of their costs
and profits. Consequently when portfolio performance seems unsatis-
factory, the creditor raises the cutoff. When greater volume is desired,
it lowers its cutoff.
ECOA and Scoring
Until 1977, credit scoring comprised a technology largely unregu-
lated by the government. Designers could construct systems using any
criteria they wanted. Creditors could make any use of a system they
saw fit. Use of scoring increased solely because of its business
advantages.
In 1976 Congress passed certain amendments to the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA).114 Effective March 23, 1977, these amend-
ments added race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public
assistance, or good faith exercise of any Consumer Credit Protection
111. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 68; Management Tool, supra note 1, at 22.
112. New Math, supra note 6, at 5; Management Tool, supra note 1, at 22.
113. See Greer, supra note 16, at 400; Hettenhouse & Wentworth, Credit Analysis
Mfodel-A New Lookfor Credit Scoring, J. COMM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1971, at 26; Mil-
letti, Big Banks' New Strategies, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1978, at 61, col. 3; Orgier, supra note
19, at 31.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
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Act right as prohibited bases, to the 1975 version of the Act which pro-
hibited credit discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.
115
Almost as an aside, however, the Act noted that a creditor does not
discriminate if it uses "any empirically derived credit system which
considers age if such system is demonstrably and statistically sound in
accordance with regulations of the [Federal Reserve] Board, except that
in the operation of such system the age of an elderly applicant may not
be assigned a negative factor or value .... 11116 This section investi-
gates the effect of the federal legislation upon credit scoring.
Demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically derived credit system
With the advent of ECOA, the Federal Reserve Board" 7 assumed
the duty of interpreting Congress' prohibition against credit discrimi-
nation and its impact upon scoring technology. In writing ECOA regu-
lations the Board faced several problems of system coverage and
definition, such as what constitutes a demonstrably and statistically
sound, empirically derived credit system, or when does an elderly ap-
plicant receive a negative factor or value for age.
The Board's Regulation B responds to these quandries by dividing
all credit analysis into two halves: (1) judgmental systems and (2) de-
monstrably and statistically sound, empirically derived credit systems.
Only systems that conform to detailed regulatory standards fall into the
latter category." 8 All other approaches to credit analysis comprise
judgmental systems." 9 Judgmental systems therefore include the vast
majority of credit analysis techniques, including procedures not actu-
ally involving a credit officer's personal interview and evaluation of the
applicant.
In compliance with its Congressional mandate to define what con-
stitutes a demonstrable and statistically sound, empirically derived
credit system, the Board adopted a two-stage approach. To be "empiri-
cally derived" a credit system must operate in certain general ways. To
be "demonstrably and statistically sound," as well as empirically de-
rived, the scoring system must pass a series of additional tests. In par-
ticular, an empirically derived credit system must evaluate
creditworthiness primarily by allocating points to applicant attributes.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1975).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(3) (1976).
117. Hereinafter called the "Board."
118. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 .2(p) (1978).
119. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(t) (1978).
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The points must derive from empirical comparison of the creditworthy
and noncreditworthy applicant population of the creditor. The creditor
must use the overall score to determine applicant creditworthiness, but
may also consider other information.
Once these threshold requirements are met, the empirically de-
rived system is deemed demonstrably and statistically sound if it meets
three statistical standards. These Regulation B tests impose only mini-
mal statistical standards for predictive accuracy. Any professional de-
veloper of scoring systems would, for mathematical and business
reasons, insist that a system pass a much more rigorous battery of tests
before releasing it for actual use. Any system with a modicum of pre-
dictive power should easily pass government specifications.
The Board's first test of soundness seeks to assure accurate devel-
opment data. In particular, the data used to develop the system must
consist of either the whole applicant population or else a proper sample
drawn from the whole applicant population.' 20 The applicant popula-
tion includes, of course, both rejected and accepted applicants. Any
development sample which properly integrates rejected applicants into
the system will therefore accurately represent the attributes of the ac-
tual, underlying population. A statistically biased sample could result
in inaccurate predictions of creditworthiness or unnecessary harm to a
class of applicants protected by ECOA. The creditor's business interest
in reliable credit analysis parallels any regulatory compulsion to use
proper sampling.
As the second standard, Regulation B requires validation of a
newly developed system prior to its regular use on incoming appli-
cants.' 21 Upon validation the system must separate creditworthy and
noncreditworthy applicants at a statistically significant rate. This re-
quirement apparently means that the system must have some predictive
accuracy. That is, it should make credit decisions at least slightly better
than a completely random process. The regulation does not specify the
level by which the system's performance must exceed zero. Courts in
employment discrimination cases may well, however, accept as statisti-
cally significant correlations that could happen randomly only five
times in 100 trials (a ninety-five percent significance level).'2
For business reasons, most professional developers employ more
rigorous tests of accuracy than is required by the regulations. A
120. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(i) (1978).
121. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2) (iii) (1978).
122. Eg., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975).
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holdout sample, for example, compares the system's predictions with
the known performance of a different group of applicants.12 3 A com-
parison of the system's results to a hypothetical system having perfect
predictive ability might constitute an even more rigorous performance
requirement.
The Board's third test for system soundness applies only after the
system becomes operational. As time passes, the nature of a creditor's
applicants will change and the predictive power of its scoring system
will inevitably decay. The creditor must therefore "revalidate" its sys-
tem at appropriate intervals. 124
A revalidation would employ the same statistical tests as the initial
validation. However, the revalidation sample consists of recent credit
applicants who have since developed representative credit experience.
This recent sample replaces the applicant sample used in the initial val-
idation, whose credit performance has since become outdated. Com-
parison of the system's predictions to the revalidation sample's actual
credit performance yields a statistic expressing the system's continuing
predictive power.
Again, Regulation B imposes a less stringent standard for
revalidation than a professional developer would employ. The eco-
nomics of credit granting usually require a much higher degree of accu-
racy than merely "nonrandom." A creditor makes only a moderate
profit from a satisfactory account, while it can lose a large amount of
the credit's principal balance and incur substantial collection costs on
an unsatisfactory account. Accordingly, there exist strong business rea-
sons for abandoning a decaying system long before it fails the mini-
mum regulatory test for revalidation.
Regulation B leaves certain details of revalidation within the cred-
itor's discretion. For example, it does not specify the tests that the de-
veloper must use or the significance level that the revalidation of the
system's accuracy must attain. As noted above, a Phi coefficient and a
ninety-five percent significance level, a medium standard for error, are
probably acceptable.125
Regulation B also omits explicit guidance as to how frequently
revalidation must occur. Since the national population's financial
123. See text accompanying note 111-15 supra.
124. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 .2(p)( 2) (iv) (1978); Long, Credit Screening System
Selection, 11 J. FiNANcAL & QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs 363 (1976), reprinted in PURDUE
CREDrr RESEARCH CENTER REPRINT No. 4.
125. See authorities cited note 31 supra.
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characteristics change with the major business cycle, this presumably
would be the maximum period between revalidations. Economists,
however, do not wholly agree as to the length of the American business
cycle. 126 Accordingly, the creditor may find that its scoring system
loses the minimum accuracy necessary to do business profitably long
before Regulation B compels revalidation.
Finally, the third Regulation B test neglects to articulate the conse-
quences of a failure to revalidate. By negative implication, the system
would lose its designation as a "demonstrably and statistically sound"
system. It might, however, retain its appellation as an "empirically de-
rived" system because its method of operation and its origin continue
to conform to that portion of the Regulation B definition.127 Curiously,
an empirically derived credit system that no longer meets the tests for
demonstrable and statistical soundness, would apparently constitute a
judgmental system.128 The creditor could, therefore, still legally use the
failed system, so long as it does not score the age of applicants.129 Nev-
ertheless, the creditor presumably would replace such a system because
of the need for accurate creditworthness predictions.
Two competing considerations may have affected the Board's de-
cision as to how rigorous to make the standards for verifying the statis-
tical validity of scoring systems. First, many creditors use poorly
developed, inaccurate scoring systems. If a group of credit officers
meets to select characteristics and scores on the basis of their anecdotal
experience, the resultant "scoring" system will predict creditworthiness
less reliably than a mathematically rigorous system. The nonempiri-
cally derived system may reflect the prejudices of its creators and
thereby unnecessarily disadvantage some protected classes of appli-
cants. Imposition of strict statistical standards assures that all scoring
systems in use measure actual creditworthiness, rather than perceived
creditworthiness.
The second competing consideration concerns the high potential
for discrimination in judgmental systems of credit analysis. A properly
126. Eg., G. HABERLER, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUA-
TIONS (Financial Research Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies
in Consumer Instalment Financing No. 9, 1942); G. MOORE & P. KLEIN, THE QUALITY OF
CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 102 (1967).
127. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(1) (1978).
128. Regulation B defines a judgmental system as "any system for evaluating the
creditworthiness of an applicant other than a demonstrably and statistically sound, empiri-
cally derived credit system." Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(t) (1978).
129. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(ii), (iii) (1978).
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developed scoring system should measure only creditworthiness. It
may still confer less credit on some protected classes of applicants, but
it does so because of their past credit performance and socioeconomic
characteristics, rather than because of intentional or accidental discrim-
ination. In contrast, credit analysis based on human evaluation of non-
quantifiable factors such as the applicant's "character" offers
considerable opportunity for the introduction of human prejudice.
Too rigorous a validation standard for scoring systems would dis-
qualify many poorly developed systems from inclusion within the defi-
nition of demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically derived
credit systems. They would comprise judgmental systems, however,
which cannot consider age as a characteristic. This would encourage
creditors to revert to purely judgmental systems with their high poten-
tial for discrimination.
The Board, therefore, had to balance the discriminatory potential
of inaccurate scoring systems against that of judgmental systems, when
deciding how rigorous to make validation standards. The Board may
have concluded that encouraging empirical techniques would result in
the least discrimination. Regulation B therefore has relatively low sta-
tistical standards. The desire for mathematical purity defers to the de-
sire for the development of scoring techniques. In addition,
mathematicians do not fully agree about what "validation" means in a
purely theoretical context.
Negativefactor or value
Having defined what makes a scoring system demonstrably and
statistically sound, as well as empirically derived, the Board faced the
further task of defining what actions constitute assigning a "negative
factor of value" to the age of an elderly applicant. 30 Regulation B
defines "negative factor or value" as meaning "in relation to the age of
elderly applicants, utilizing a factor, value, or weight that is less
favorable regarding elderly applicants than the creditor's experience
warrants or is less favorable than the factor, value, or weight assigned
to the class of applicants that are not classified as elderly applicants
and are most favored by a creditor on the basis of age."' 3' A creditor
can score the applicant's age directly. Normally an elderly applicant
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(3) (1976); Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. 202.6(B)(2)(ii) (1978).
131. Compare Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(v) (1978) with Proposed Regulation B, §
202.2(u), 41 Fed. Reg. 28,870, 29,879 (1976) and Proposed Regulation B, § 202.2(u), 41 Fed.
Reg. 49,123, 49,133 (1976).
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gets the number of points for age that the development process assigns
on the basis of age-related default rates. If, however, one of the
nonelderly attribute cells earns a higher age score because of better
credit performance, then the elderly applicants receive at least that
many points for age, regardless of their actual credit performance.
Several reasonable interpretations of "negative factor or value"
have been suggested. This provision might have prohibited the direct
consideration of age by a scoring system, even if demonstrably and sta-
tistically sound. Under this interpretation, however, a system could use
characteristics such as time on the job or time of local residence, that
have a high correlation with age. Some commentators believe that a
complete prohibition of direct consideration of age best protects the
elderly from unwarranted discrimination, and at least one state has em-
braced this approach. 32
This interpretation ignores the language of ECOA, that provides
in relevant part: "It shall not constitute discrimination. . . for a credi-
tor. . . to use any empirically derived credit system which considers
age .... 133 Congress would not have inserted this language ex-
pressly allowing age consideration in scoring systems if it intended an
absolute prohibition. In the first place, the Act's general prohibition on
age discrimination alone should have curtailed all consideration of age.
In addition, Congress knew that the elderly comprise the age category
presenting the best credit risks. 134 Permitting consideration of age
would increase the amount of credit the elderly will receive.
Concluding that Congress intended to permit credit scoring sys-
tems to consider an applicant's age directly, Regulation B then con-
fronts the question of how a system can score age. At least four
alternatives present themselves. It could permit scoring systems to con-
sider age in any manner consistent with statistical principles. Alter-
nately, it could prohibit a scoring system from specially disadvantaging
elderly applicants by requiring that it allocate to the age-attribute cell
for elderly applicants at least as many points as to the nonelderly age-
attribute cell scoring the least number of points. It could also require
that elderly applicants receive at least as many points for their age as
the class of nonelderly applicants most favored on the basis of age. Fi-
nally, it could mandate that elderly applicants receive some median
number of points for their age, relative to the points allocated to other
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)(1)(b).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(3) (1976).
134. H. R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1975).
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age groups.1 3
5
Again, two competing considerations affect the choice among
these possible interpretations of "negative factor or value." First, be-
cause the elderly have the best credit performance of any age group,136
minimum government interference with scoring would generally result
in their receiving the most points of any age class. Second, because of
the impact on large numbers of elderly applicants that would result
from improper scoring, 137 extensive government intervention, and a
broad interpretation of "negative factor or value," may be justified.
The interpretation finally adopted in Regulation B succeeds in si-
multaneously satisfying both competing considerations. Elderly appli-
cants must receive the higher of (1) the score warranted on the basis of
that creditor's experience with elderly applicants or (2) the score as-
signed to the class of nonelderly applicants most favored on the basis of
age.138 Given that elderly applicants usually demonstrate the highest
creditworthiness, for most creditors this means that the elderly receive
the same number of points for age that they would have if age scores
were assigned on purely statistical bases. For those very few creditors
whose population of elderly applicants does not demonstrate the maxi-
mum creditworthiness, Regulation B requires that they receive the ad-
vantage of the same score as the most creditworthy age group. This
bifurcated treatment of age confers the maximum possible amount of
credit on the elderly while doing minimal damage to the predictive ac-
curacy of the scoring system and the quality of the creditor's portfolio.
It also minimizes the need for continuing government intervention.
A related controversy concerns the definition of the age at which
an applicant becomes "elderly." Congress wanted to protect the eld-
erly, but never articulated a precise definition of the term. The Board
initially elected to emulate this legislative omission, 139 and therefore
every applicant became elderly with respeci to all younger applicants.
If the Board defed "negative factor or value" as meaning that elderly
applicants must receive no fewer points than the lowest nonelderly age
score, then every age category would have to receive at least as many
points as the next youngest age category. The scores for age would
135. Letters of comment from the public to the Federal Reserve Board on Proposed
Regulation B, 1976 (on file under Docket No. R-0031).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
137. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
138. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(v) (1978).
139. Proposed Regulation B, § 202.2,41 Fed. Reg. 29,870, 29,878 (1976); Proposed Reg-
ulation B, § 202.2, 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123, 49,133 (1976).
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then form a monotonically increasing function. 140 In certain cases, this
would result in excessively favorable treatment for middle-aged appli-
cants, a group whose creditworthiness typically drops, while not partic-
ularly aiding older applicants.
141
To avoid such unrealistic outcomes, Regulation B does define eld-
erly. Obviously, such a decision involves certain arbitrary elements.
As a policy matter, by choosing a low age such as fifty or fifty-five,
more applicants would receive the benefit of coverage by the "negative
factor or value" prohibition. By selecting a very high figure such as
seventy or seventy-five, fewer applicants would fall into the elderly age
category, but the category would receive a much larger number of
points because creditworthiness usually continues to rise sharply with
advancing age. Regulation B's definition of elderly as ages sixty-two
and up constitutes something of a compromise, and is consistent with
the Social Security laws.
142
Reasons for Adverse Action
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act also requires that when a credi-
tor declines to grant a request for credit, it must give the applicant a
statement of the reasons for the adverse action. 143 Congress stated that
the reasons given must be specific, but did not illustrate what constitute
specific reasons for credit refusal by a scoring system. A scoring sheet
presents certain obstacles to arriving at any meaningful selection of
reasons for an application's refusal. Each applicant's final score de-
rives from the cumulative effect of his attributes. The creditor rejects
the applicant because the total score falls below the preselected cutoff.
All of the submaximum characteristics therefore contribute jointly to
the applicant's failure to get the credit. In addition, creditors adjust
their cutoff score from time to time in response to changing business
conditions. Had the applicantion been submitted at a different time,
140. A monotonically increasing function is a mathematical sequence whose successive
members either increase or stay the same, but do not oscillate in relative value. For the
ECOA this would mean that as applicant age increases, the points assigned for that age must
either become larger or remain constant, but never decline. Figure 6 depicts a monotoni-
cally increasing function, although that graph does not relate to age and does not increase
because of a statutory requirement.
141. Letter from Richard F. Kerr, Federated Department Stores, to Neil Butler, Federal
Reserve Board staff (Dec. 9, 1976) (on file with the Federal Reserve Board under Docket
No. R-0031).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B) (1970).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (1976).
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when the creditor had a lower cutoff, the applicant might have ob-
tained the credit.
Regulation B therefore confronts the problem of determining what
constitutes a set of specific reasons for adverse action by a credit scor-
ing system. Users of scoring systems argue that the specificity require-
ment is satisfied simply by informing the rejected applicant that he
failed to score enough points to pass the cutoff score.1 " This standard
would also substantially simplify the logistics of generating the ad-
verse-action notices required by ECOA. A single preprinted notice giv-
ing the same reason, "insufficient score," would go to all applicants
rejected by scoring.
Regulation B does not embrace this approach. Users of scoring
systems must give "specific" reasons.145 "Insufficient points" states a
conclusion, not the underlying reasons that caused the failure to attain
the needed score.
When enacting ECOA, Congress wanted applicants to receive spe-
cific reasons for adverse action so that they could use this information
to take remedial action. 46 If the creditor bases its decision on errone-
ous assumptions then the applicant can take steps to rectify this misap-
prehension. For example, when the statement of reasons discloses "no
credit file found" as the reason for denial, the applicant can submit
additional information concerning prior use of credit and possibly ob-
tain favorable reconsideration of the application. Similarly, when the
denial results from a mutable characteristic, the applicant will know to
reapply if conditions change. Thus, an applicant denied credit because
of "too short a period of local residence" would know that an applica-
tion submitted at a later date might have a better chance of approval.
The applicant needs to know what characteristics will produce addi-
tional points and how much improvement is necessary to obtain the
desired credit.
Regulation B therefore leaves the scoring-system creditor with the
problem of how to select specific reasons for rejection. Creditors have
considerable regulatory discretion in dealing with this selection ques-
tion. To date no clearly superior method, on either legal or scientific
144. Letters of comment from the public to the Federal Reserve Board on Proposed
Regulation B (1976) (on file under Docket No. R-0031).
145. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1978).
146. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-29 (1974); S. REP. No. 902,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119; H.R. REP. 751,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Exercise of Consumer Rights Under the Equal Credit Opportunity
and Fair Credit Biling 4cts, 64 FED. REs. BULL. 363, 365 (1978).
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grounds, has emerged from among the several available alternatives.
Perhaps the most widely used approach to selection of specific reasons
for denial under a credit scoring system involves judgmental selection
by a credit officer. In the judgmental system, the credit officer balances
all of the relevant information about the applicant mentally to arrive at
an adverse conclusion. It therefore seems entirely reasonable that the
same individual who made the adverse decision can arrive at a mean-
ingful selection of specific reasons for that conclusion. Where credit
was declined because of scoring, the credit officer performs only the
second function, perusing the application and determining the reasons
for the scoring system's adverse action.
147
No clear consensus presently exists on the related question of
whether judgmental selection of reasons may include characteristics
not among those on the scoring sheet. Proponents argue that ECOA
limitations on scoring apply only to the credit decision. The law im-
poses no limits on the process by which the creditor then selects reasons
for the decision. Moreover, certain events, such as bankruptcy, occur
too infrequently to warrant inclusion in the scoring sheet. However,
human scrutiny of the whole application would certainly find bank-
ruptcy to be the most meaningful reason for the applicant's lack of
creditworthiness. It merely confirms the scoring system's conclusion.
Opponents of external reason selection argue that only the charac-
teristics that contribute to the total score constitute meaningful reasons
for the applicant's failure to receive the credit. Disclosure of a reason
not scored misleads the applicant. Subsequent changes in the appli-
cant's status with respect to the disclosed reason for rejection will not
result in credit, because the overall score remains the same. Con-
versely, the scoring system might approve a subsequent application dis-
closing superior attributes, notwithstanding the stated reason for the
prior adverse action.
The other approach to disclosing reasons for adverse action in-
volves mechanical selection of the "specific reasons" to be disclosed.
When a computer does the credit analysis, it can also generate the
statement of reasons for adverse action. The reasons the machine gives
the applicant resemble those produced by a judgmental process, but
147. In the matter of Alden's, Inc., 43 Fed. Reg. 6,622, 6,624 (1978) (FTC consent agree-
ment); Letter from Anne Geary, Federal Reserve Board staff, to Lloyd Hackler, President,
American Retail Federation (Oct. 27, 1977) (on file under Docket No. EC-497); Letter from
Neil Butler, Federal Reserve Board staff, to Glenn W. Hampton (May 3, 1977) (on file
under Docket No. EC-178).
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their actual selection involves an entirely automated procedure. The
machine compares the scored characteristics to see where the applicant
lost the most points and prints out a standard form or letter. The com-
puter necessarily limits its selection to scored reasons.148
Any single applicant receiving a mechanically generated statement
of reasons gets about as much meaningful information from this proc-
ess as is received from a judgmental process. However, examination of
the mix of reasons given to the population of all rejected applicants
may reveal a deficiency in the aggregate information disclosed. If the
scoring sheet gives an extra-large number of points to one particular
attribute cell, then a majority of rejected applicants may be informed
that deficiencies with respect to this characteristic caused their rejec-
tion. As the disclosed reasons become increasingly uniform, they also
lose specificity. If the machine selects "lack of home ownership" as the
reason for virtually all adverse action, this disclosure may then have no
more meaning than "insufficient points."
Some developers have considered remedying this potential loss of
specificity by substituting other algorithms for simple subtraction when
calculating the characteristics that result in rejection. Possible alterna-
tive methods include selection based on the greatest percentage differ-
ence between points scored and points possible, the greatest difference
between points scored and average or median points scored by the
whole applicant population, or disclosure of the combination of charac-
teristics that would, with the change of one cell, give the applicant
enough points to pass the cutoff. To date, no clearly superior method
of achieving the greatest specificity has emerged. 149
A related problem in selection of reasons for adverse action in-
volves disclosure of reasons that appear contrary to common sense.
Suppose that the system development process selects time of local resi-
dence as a characteristic, sets the attribute intervals at 0-1 year, 1-4
years, 4-19 years, and over 19+ years; and assigns scores of 12, 3, 7, and
0 to the respective attributes. Further suppose that the creditor's
method of choosing reasons for adverse action results in the selection of
this characteristic for a certain applicant with twenty-one years of local
residency. The creditor therefore informs the applicant that it denied
the credit because of "excessive local residency" or "you have lived in
your present house too long." One may question whether this disclo-
148. deKerchove, Reject Reason and Scoring, ViEwpOImTS, Winter 1977, at 3.
149. ECO, supra note 14, at 103.
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sure furnishes the rejected applicant with a meaningful reason for the
adverse action.
Most judgmental systems associate increasing creditworthiness
with longer local residence. The credit officer reasons that prolonged
local residence means better applicant stability. Persons who have
lived in the neighborhood for many years seem unlikely to abandon
their established lifestyles by immediately absconding with the credi-
tor's money. In addition, they tend to enjoy reliable sources of income
with which to repay the credit.
The hypothetical scoring system appears to contradict this tradi-
tional view. This discrepancy could occur for several reasons. First,
credit applicants do not necessarily comprise a representative cross-sec-
tion of local residents of varying seniority. People may seek credit most
frequently when they have just moved into the area. If many of them
moved because they received promotions or took new jobs at higher
salaries, then people with local residence of short duration would have
unusually high creditworthiness. Second, many of the most predictive
characteristics may correlate positively with each other, as well as with
creditworthiness. Use of more than one of them would not add to the
system's basic predictive power, so the system-development process
selects only the one characteristic that predicts best for this purpose.
The system may utilize the less predictive, correlated characteristics to
refine the basic prediction to conform to the particular idiosyncrasies of
the applicant population. Accordingly, while the credit officer may
have the correct view of the average effect of a characteristic such as
time of local residence, the multivariate analysis used in system devel-
opment considers its marginal, rather than average, contribution to the
creditworthiness prediction.
Nevertheless, given the way the scoring sheet processes applica-
tions, the credit system rejects the applicant because of "too long a pe-
riod of local residence." The peculiar makeup of the system user's
creditworthy applicants or the system's particular use of the character-
istic does not make the attribute any less the reason for the adverse
decision. With proper explanation, giving this attribute as the reason
for rejection can convey just as much meaningful information as any
other properly selected reason. The ECOA mandates selection of the
"real" reason for adverse action, regardless of whether it confirms or
disabuses the applicant's notions of how credit analysis should work.150
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3) (1976); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 873, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1976).
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Effects test
When Congress amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in
1976, it expressed its intent that the effects test, first developed in rela-
tion to employment discrimination, apply to credit discrimination. 151
Regulation B incorporates this legislative intent both by reference and
in its limitation of certain credit practices.1 52 To date, little judicial
interpretation of the credit effects test has occurred. 153 Accordingly, the
credit effects test may or may not resemble its employment predecessor
closely.
The effects test originated through judicial interpretation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act which prohibits certain discrimi-
natory employment practices.' 54 The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company 55 held that unintentional, as well as intentional, dis-
crimination may violate this prohibition. 56 Employment practices that
have unequal impact on a protected class may constitute employment
discrimination even though the employer did not intend to
discriminate.
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded on this theme in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green157 and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 58 These cases establish a three part standard of proof for em-
ployment cases using the "effects test," that shifts the burden of proof
back and forth between complainant-employee and defendant-
employer: 59
1. The employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case. To do so, the employee must show that an employment
practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected class.
2. The employer may rebut the prima facie case by showing that
151. S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 2, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975).
152. Proposed Regulation B, § 202.6(a), 42 Fed. Reg. 1,242, 1,255 n.7 (1977).
153. Contra, Carroll v. Exxon, 434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (Supp. V 1975) [popularly known as Title VII].
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat.
253; and amended it extensively in 1972, see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
155. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
156. Id. at 430.
157. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
158. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
159. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-61, (1977). The
author's views on the evolution of the effects test appear more fully at Hsia, The Effects Test:
New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 777 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hsia].
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the employment practice has a manifest relationship to the job in
question.
3. It then remains open to the employee to show the availability of
an alternative employment practice that would have a less dis-
criminatory effect on the protected class and that serves the em-
ployer's legitimate business needs at least as well as the disputed
practice.
An employment practice that violates this "effects test" constitutes
illegal discrimination even though the employer may not have intended
such a result. Title VII cases measure discrimination by the effect of an
employer's policies, as well as by its motives when establishing them.
Courts use the effects test to measure the discriminatory impact of intel-
ligence tests, seniority systems, and transfer and assignment policies. 60
The effects test presents numerous interesting implications for
credit scoring systems. A scoring system may violate the effects test by
having disproportionate impact on a protected class of applicants. A
restatement of the employment effects test, as adapted to credit scoring,
might read as follows:
1. A credit applicant establishes a prima facie effects test case by
showing that the scoring system has a disproportionate impact on
a protected class of applicants.
2. The system user can rebut this prima facie case by showing that
the system predicts creditworthiness effectively.
3. The applicant can still prevail by showing the existence of an-
other scoring system, method of credit analysis, or adjustment to
the existing scoring system that has a less discriminatory impact
on the protected class and predicts creditworthiness at least as
well as the present system.
Because of the paucity of ECOA case law, the veracity, meaning,
and application of this restatement are yet unclear.' 6' The credit effects
test could conform closely to the precepts of its employment progenitor
or it could formulate its own standards for measuring unintentional
discrimination. When the courts apply the ECOA effects test to credit
scoring, they will presumably use the Albemarle formulation of a three-
step shifting burden of persuasion as at least a starting point.162 How-
ever, a number of considerations distinguish measurement of credit dis-
crimination from measurement of employment discrimination.
160. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(seniority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (seniority); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (testing); Swint v. Pullman Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1976) (seniority); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976) (testing); Sagers
v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1976) (transfers and seniority).
161. Hsia, supra note 159, at 790-95.
162. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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First, there remain the evidentiary difficulties of determining the
demographic composition of the applicant population.163 Regulation B
prohibits creditors from asking about an applicant's sex or race in con-
nection with a request for an extension of credit unless the transaction
involves the purchase of residential real property. 1' Accordingly, for
most applications the system user does not have reliable information
about the demographic makeup of its applicant population. Without
statistical data, proof of disparate effect, manifest relationship, or alter-
native practice becomes most difficult. At most, some system users will
have data on the marital status and age of their applicant populations.
Reconstruction of prohibited bases such as sex and race would require
indirect inferences from available information. For example, the sys-
tem user can guess at an applicant's sex with a fair degree of reliability
by using the first name disclosed on application forms,165 and an appli-
cant's home address may be used to estimate racial demographics by
comparing them to census tract data.
66
Second, users of scoring systems can measure both the credit per-
formance of individual borrowers and the predictive performance of
the scoring system with much greater precision than an employer can
measure either job performance or the ability of employment practices
to predict such performance. Most of the leading employment effects-
test cases involved unskilled work. In Griggs, the job in question in-
volved shoveling coal from one end of a courtyard and feeding it into a
slot at the other end of the yard.' 67 Determining how well a person
shovels coal necessarily presents certain quantification difficulties. Ba-
sically, most people of a given strength can shovel coal adequately.
Choosing among available candidates, therefore, entails employer dis-
cretion, rather than screening based on personal qualifications. This
element of uncertainty may cause courts to examine claims of "mani-
fest relationship" closely. Scoring suffers from no such handicap of ad-
163. Employment cases rely heavily upon statistical comparisons of the percentages of
members of protected classes hired by the employer and available for employment in the
surrounding area. Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 660 (5th Cir. 1976);
Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1975). Indeed, some opinions
view statistical evidence as essential to establishing the prima facie case. Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 1976); Sager v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529
F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1976).
164. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3), (5) (1978).
165. This may no longer be true, given the increasing use of androgynous and hyphen-
ated names.
166. Such methods have been uncovered in regard to employment discrimination.
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
167. 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
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measurement. Past customers fall readily into satisfactory and
unsatisfactory groups.168 The predictions of the scoring system are con-
firmed or belied by the subsequent credit history of accepted appli-
cants, and the scoring system's rate of error is precisely quantified.
This increased ability to measure individual credit performance and
overall credit predictions should make determinations of manifest rela-
tionship and the acceptability of alternative scoring systems obvious.
Third, an employer has a limited number of job openings. It will
hire only enough applicants to fill its openings. In contrast, the quanti-
ty of credit available depends mainly upon its cost. 169 At the proper
price, unlimited supplies of credit probably exist. At another price, un-
limited demand for credit occurs. Instead of seeking the one applicant
best qualified to receive the credit, the credit analyst can accept any
number of creditworthy applicants. If the creditor disburses al of its
funds and it still has qualified applicants willing to pay for credit, it can
simply buy more money.
Fourth, the creditor lacks the employer's continuing control over
its accepted applicants. If an employee proves unsatisfactory, the em-
ployer can always dismiss the worker. If done rapidly, the employer
can minimize the unsatisfactory employee's damage to the organiza-
tion. Credit usually lacks such safeguards. Once the creditor disburses
the principal, it largely loses control over the borrower. It has few deci-
sive steps, analogous to dismissal, that it can take to minimize the dam-
age done by an unsatisfactory borrower. Acceleration of the
obligation, repossession of any collateral, and aggressive collection ef-
forts may recover some of the credit's principal, but these measures do
not always produce complete repayment.170 This inability to effectively
limit losses after disbursement greatly increases the importance of ac-
curate credit analysis.
Fifth, credit transactions typically occur with greater frequency
than the process of hiring. Presumably, most Americans only hold one
or two jobs. However, the same worker may simultaneously engage in
multiple credit transactions.17 ' The large number of "events"
processed by a scoring system permits far more reliable statistical con-
168. However, see note 65 and accompanying text supra, which suggest that credit scor-
ing does not always successfully identify satisfactory credit applicants.
169. G. HABERLER, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
33-50 (Financial Research Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies
in Consumer Instalment Financing No. 9, 1942). However, usury laws impose nonmarket
ceilings on interest rates in many states.
170. BEEBE, supra note 26, at 155; PHELPS, supra note 29, at 193.
171. See B. BERNSTEIN, THE PATTERN OF CONSUMER DEBT, 1935-36 (Financial Re-
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clusions than do the smaller number of "events" processed by a given
hiring procedure.
Sixth, employers draw their job applicants from a nonunique local
market. The same people who carry coal from one end of the yard to
the other can also load sawdust into a papermaking machine. Except
for positions requiring special qualifications, essentially all the inhabit-
ants around the employer's place of business comprise potential job
applicants.172 Courts measure disproportionate effect by comparing the
demographic composition of defendant's employees to that of the sur-
rounding community. In contrast, the applicants to a particular credi-
tor do constitute a unique subpopulation.173 Adjacent creditors may
appeal to entirely different segments of the local populace. This spe-
cialized identification may derive from the community's perception of
the creditor's policies, the nature of its business, the direction of its ad-
vertising, or other factors. Because of this segmentation in credit mar-
kets, comparison of community demographics with the makeup of the
creditor's borrowers does not necessarily show disparate impact upon
its applicant population. Proper methodology would contrast only that
creditor's applicants with its borrowers.
Allocation ofproofs
Given the preceding considerations, it is necessary to consider how
the courts might apply the foregoing statement of the effects test to
credit scoring. To begin with, the middle step should largely disappear.
Any moderately accurate scoring system automatically has a manifest
relationship with creditworthiness. 174 The user, for purely business
reasons, rapidly discards any system which fails to perform effec-
tively.175 A cursory showing that default rates remain at acceptable
levels should suffice to prove the system's continuing predictive power.
As with system validation, probably anything which classifies appli-
cants better than a completely random process would qualify as a busi-
ness necessity.
The burden of proof in a scoring-effects-test case therefore falls
search Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Consumer Instal-
ment Financing No. 6, 1940).
172. See note 163 supra; see text accompanying note 206 infra.
173. Hsia, supra note 159, at 794 n.87; Main, supra note 1; see authorities cited note 206
infra.
174. ECO, supra note 14, at 107.
175. Scoring's primary economic justification is the profitability it confers through more
accurate credit analysis and reduced operating costs. See note 30 & accompanying text
supra.
November 1978] CREDIT SCORING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
almost solely upon the plaintiff, who must show both disparate impact
and the availability of a less discriminatory alternative. The incom-
pleteness of demographic information about the applicant population
increases the plaintiffs evidentiary burden in connection with the first
step of the effects test. 176 In addition, presentation of a less discrimina-
tory credit system and testing of its effects requires a full scale research
and development effort entailing all of the steps enumerated above.
The creditor can assume the five and six figure cost of system develop-
ment because the business advantage of highly accurate credit analysis
justifies the expense. 177 The credit applicant turned disgruntled liti-
gant, however, lacks this economic justification for system development
efforts. Finally, because the rejected applicant lacks quantifiable dam-
ages, it seems unlikely that even a successful class action would yield
sufficient proceeds to warrant creating a substitute method of credit
analysis. 78
The would-be plaintiff faces one further obstacle to proffering an
alternative scoring system. Its development requires a representative
sample of the defendant-creditor's applicants. 179 The system user con-
trols access to this data and might justifiably resist surrendering it.
First, disclosure of information about credit applicants to a third party
might contravene the protections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.' 80
Second, it might intrude upon the applicants' personal privacy.'
8'
Third, since the composition of applicant populations varies considera-
bly from creditor to creditor, it might well constitute proprietary mate-
rial not subject to unlimited discovery. 8 2
176. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
177. See text accompanying note 30 supra. See generally sources cited by S. MILLER, A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES AND REGULATIONS 29 (Purdue Credit
Research Center Monograph No. 7, 1977).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1976); R. CLONTZ, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY MANUAL 2-9
(rev. ed. 1977).
179. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(l) (1976).
181. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); In re Request for Judicial Assistance, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1977).
182. Eg., American Loan Corp. v. California Commercial Corp., 211 Cal. App. 515,27
Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963); Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314,
189 A.2d 390 (1963); Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d




Tradeoffs between protected classes
Many important and more difficult effects-test issues remain un-
resolved under Title VII despite the availability of a large volume of
employment case law. However, application of this analogous body of
law to credit scoring often obfuscates rather than illuminates these
issues.
Foremost among the unresolved issues pertaining to the credit ef-
fects test is the question of whether an alternative system proposed by
the plaintiff under step three of the effects test can reduce discrimina-
tion against one protected class while increasing its disparate effect on
another protected class. Varying or replacing the existing system could
give substantially more credit to one protected class while maintaining
the same overall default rate and volume of accepted applicants. The
alternative therefore has less discriminatory impact on that class while
still predicting creditworthiness equally well. It may, however, simulta-
neously have an adverse effect on another protected class.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff proposes eliminating
homeownership as a characteristic. Because of housing discrimination,
relatively few minority applicants own homes. Therefore, eliminating
homeownership might substantially increase the volume of
creditworthy minority applicants accepted. Assume that the addition
of more creditworthy minority borrowers to the creditor's portfolio
would not affect its size or profitability because of their small numbers
relative to the balance of the portfolio. Further suppose, however, that
no longer considering homeownership would also have the effect of re-
jecting increased numbers of creditworthy female applicants. Moder-
ate numbers of females own homes and this attribute predicts their
creditworthiness very accurately. If women homeowners make excel-
lent credit risks, then eliminating consideration of this "pertinent ele-
ment of creditworthiness" reduces the creditor's predictive accuracy
with respect to female applicants and, thereby, the quantity of credit
they receive. 8 3
Recent reverse discrimination cases may help resolve this di-
lemma. The Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits
"[dliscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority or
majority."'184 Elsewhere, the same opinion refers to special disadvan-
183. G. CHANDLER & D. EWERT, DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX UNDER THE
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY AcT (Purdue Credit Research Center Working Paper No. 8,
1976) [hereinafter cited as CHANDLER & EWERT].
184. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Griggs v. Duke.
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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tages imposed upon any group. Altering an otherwise demonstrably
and statistically sound, empirically derived credit system solely to favor
one protected class at the expense of another protected class would
therefore appear to contravene this judicial principle.
Degree of discrimination reduction
Another unresolved ECOA effects-test issue concerns the degree
by which the plaintiff's proposed alternative must reduce discrimina-
tory effect. Must it result in substantially less adverse impact on the
protected class in order to establish the effects-test case or will very
slight improvement in the status of the class suffice?
Employment-discrimination decisions have not yet resolved this
question under Title VII. Although employment effects-test litigation
has generated a large volume of case law incorporating much sweeping
language, no opinions have found it necessary to reach the third step
and apply the pertinent facts to proposed alternative-employment prac-
tices. Future litigants may draw upon at least two different lines of
analysis, deriving from the earlier steps of disparate-impact analysis.
18 5
One approach comes from decisions analyzing the prima facie case
showing disparate impact. 8 6 These decisions rely heavily on statistical
tests to establish discrimination. The percentage of job applicants hired
from the protected class is compared to the defendant's overall hiring
rate. Mathematically derived tests calculate whether differences in the
hiring rates occur randomly or as a result of systematic discrimina-
tion.'8 7 The Supreme Court has indicated that if the tests were other-
wise valid that statistically significant differences at the ninety-five
percent level of reliability would constitute sufficient evidence for a
prima facie, effects-test discrimination case.'
88
Under this approach to the third step of the ECOA effects test, the
plaintiff would have to establish that the alternative proposal would
result in statistically significant reductions in disparate impact. Estab-
lishing such reductions would involve a comparison of the existing
185. Hsia, supra note 159, at 784. The most recent discussion of the role of statistics in
analyzing discrimination appears in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308-14 (1977).
186. See e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 (1977); Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,339 n.20 (1977); accord, Nashville
Gas v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
187. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975); United States v. Elevator
Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th
Cir. 1976).
188. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975).
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scoring system's approval rate for creditworthy applicants from the
protected class and for the complete applicant population, with the pro-
jected approval rate for each population by the proposed alternative
system. Properly selected contingency tests would determine whether
differences are statistically significant at the required level. 8 9 Under
this standard, the plaintiffs alternative would have to produce a rela-
tively large reduction in discrimination in order to establish the effects
test's final step.
A second possible approach to divining the degree of improvement
in nondiscrimination required of the alternative proposal derives from
dicta with respect to the second step of the effects test. When comment-
ing on manifest relationship and business necessity, the courts have re-
peatedly said that an employer must go "as far as possible" to eliminate
discrimination.1 90 It must use the practice having the least possible dis-
parate impact to effectively argue that the practice amounts to a busi-
ness necessity.
An alternative scoring system, under this standard, would merely
have to marginally reduce discrimination. Even a slight lessening of
the adverse impact on the protected class would suffice to establish the
final step of the ECOA effects test. Although employment cases have
not yet progressed to the point of choosing between these alternative
standards for measuring the third step of the effects test, credit scoring
imposes certain additional considerations. These special distinctions
between scoring and employment practices support the judicial adop-
tion of the former, less rigorous standard.
In the first place, use of the latter, very strict standard will impose
more development costs on an already very expensive technology. Its
adoption would place system developers in the position of having to
discover all available combinations of characteristics, attributes, and
scores which maximize the separation between creditworthy and non-
creditworthy applicants. 91 The system developer must then select
from among them the system that has the least unequal impact on the
classes of applicants protected by ECOA. Such redundant develop-
189. Id.; BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 275-76.
190. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Green v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th
Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 56 (5th Cir. 1974); rev'd on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th
Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Robinson V. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1971), cerl. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
191. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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ment of multiple systems would proportionately multiply the creditor's
cost of installation. Such additional costs will have the secondary result
of discouraging creditors from using scoring systems, and encouraging
use of the relatively more discriminatory judgmental systems.' 92 In ad-
dition, the resources diverted by both creditor and applicant into devel-
opment of multiple systems to attain marginal improvements in
nondiscrimination could be far more cost-effective if used to combat
discrimination elsewhere in the credit process.
Requiring pre-use selection among multiple alternative systems
may require that the creditor make tradeoffs between different pro-
tected classes, as described above.' 93 One system may select
creditworthy elderly applicants with unusual accuracy while perform-
ing poorly with married women. Another system may accurately select
creditworthy minorities while operating to the disadvantage of certain
religious groups. How can the system user select among them? Al-
though advocates of linear programming may feel that this tradeoff will
readily yield to the dispassionate calculation of the greatest good for
the greatest number, such detachment will hardly mollify the specific
applicant, rejected by the selected system, who would have received
credit from an alternative system.' 94
Employment practices do not present quite such graphic choices.
Employment cases frequently use the effects test to detect intentional
discrimination disguised by facially neutral practices. The court fre-
quently lacks sufficient data on the effect of a proposed alternative em-
ployment practice on other protected classes. In addition, the
challenged practice may affect only one particular group. An unrea-
sonable height and weight requirement or a policy of terminating preg-
nant employees clearly has disparate impact on females.' 95 Altering
192. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
193. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
194. K. ARROW, L. HuRWIcZ & H. UZAWA, STUDIES IN LINEAR AND NONLINEAR PRO-
GRAMMING (1958); J. BOOT, QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING (1964); G. HADLEY, LINEAR PRO-
GRAMMING (1963); G. HADLEY, NONLINEAR AND DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING (1964); M.
SIMONNARD, LINEAR PROGRAMMING (1966).
195. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d
492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 933; and Castro v.
Beecher, 495 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) with United States v. Chicato, 411 F. Supp. 218 (N.D.
IM. 1976); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873
(C.D. Cal. 1976); Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal.
1975); and Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (Ky. 1974). The Supreme Court
addressed maternity in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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such practices will only marginally affect racial minorities or particular
religious groups.
Credit scoring methodology presents the parties with more infor-
mation about the applicant population and the exact effect of alterna-
tive systems upon the population. 96 Potential tradeoffs between cost
and marginal changes in adverse impact between different protected
classes, therefore, become overt. The advent of more accurate mea-
surements does not necessarily mean that courts should automatically
embrace the most rigorous standard susceptible of measurement.
Rather, they should balance all the known considerations and avail
themselves of the unresolved nature of Title VII interpretation to select
the standard which will in the long run minimize discrimination
against all credit applicants.
Degree of increased losses
Some consumer advocates suggest that reducing discrimination by
using the effects test may entail less accurate credit analysis and in-
creased loan losses.197 This argument capitalizes on the fact that credit-
scoring technology can quantitatively compare the performance of al-
ternative prediction systems and their effect on the various protected
classes of applicants. A court, therefore, no longer needs to wallow in
vague conclusions about "unavailable alternatives," "manifest relation-
ship," or "business needs."' 98 Confronted with statistical evidence that
0.01% loss of predictive accuracy will result in fifty percent reduction in
discriminatory impact, it could rule that the effects test requires the sys-
tem user to accept this minor increase in losses in order to sizeably
reduce discrimination.
Such a rule, however, might appear potentially undesirable. First,
mere availability of more accurate credit data does not necessarily
mandate its immediate use. Second, creditors use scoring systems to
make profits. For them, maximizing profit constitutes a business neces-
sity. A court may properly require changes that reduce discriminatory
impact without affecting profitability. Any diversion of a business'
196. CHANDLER & EWERT, supra note 183; G. Chandler, Special Purpose Credit Scoring
Models for Protected Classes (Oct. 7, 1977) (paper presented before the Citicorp Conference
on Special Purpose Credit Programs); Control Systems, supra note 92; Roy & Lewis, su ra
note 7, at 17; Roy & Sanderson, supra note 17.
197. Letter from Dr. Edward M. Lewis, Fair, Isaac and Company, to the author (Jan. 6,
1978) (on ile with The Hastings Law Journal).
198. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 523
F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964- A Wo.lternative .pproach, 84 YALE LJ. 98, 101 (1974).
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profits to serve purely social ends, however, distorts the economy and
constrains the free flow of funds to those areas best able to use them.
Finally, any line-drawing process presents a certain potential for
unanticipated excess. 199 A 0.01% decrease in the repayment rate may
seem like a good tradeoff for a fifty percent decrease in disparate im-
pact, but what about 2% for 20%, 15% for 1%, or 100% for 0.01%? Se-
lection among relative repayment and approval rates compares apples
and oranges. No common basis for undertaking a cost-benefit analysis
exists. Accordingly, judicial forums uniformly should avoid selection
of mandatory decreases in predictive accuracy as an acceptable price
for increased acceptance of creditworthy applicants from the protected
class.
Inclusion ofjudgmental elements
The earlier description of how credit scoring systems operate as-
sumed that the system has the final decision with regard to which appli-
cants get credit. Everyone above the cutoff score receives credit.
Everyone below the cutoff receives an adverse action notice. In reality,
the credit process tends to lack this mathematical purity.2°° Certain
judgmental elements usually intrude.
This judgmental intrusion occurs because creditor managements
do not fully understand scoring systems or trust scoring techniques.
The scoring sheet may not confirm their intuitive beliefs about what
characteristics associate well with creditworthiness. Given the amount
of money at stake, the creditor refuses to blindly trust the system's pre-
dictions and insists upon second guessing it judgmentally. This over-
ride typically takes the form of a reexamination by a credit officer of
the scoring system's credit approvals or denials, depending upon
whether the creditor's present business strategy calls for expansion of
approvals or reduction of default rates.
199. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's conclusions about distinguishing a
small tax from a large tax in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 432 (1819); its more
recent difficulties in deciding what constitutes obscenity, Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767
(1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669
(1976); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); or its struggles with the merits of capital punish-
ment, Richmond v. Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Moore v. Ilinos, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
200. Churchill, Nevin & Watson, The Role of Credit Scoring in the Loan Decision, THE
CREDIT WORLD, Mar. 1977, at 6; Overrides: Are They 4 Help or 4 HinderanceZ VIEW-
Porers, Summer/Fall 1977, at 1.
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Addition of judgmental overrides probably does not increase the
predictive accuracy of a creditor's final decisions.201 The perfect system
of credit analysis, which accepts all creditworthy applicants and rejects
all noncreditworthy applicants, has not yet been developed. An empir-
ically based credit system using all available information, makes the
most accurate prediction statistically possible and predicts the rate at
which it will make classification errors. Judgmental second guessing
based on the same information would, in the aggregate, misclassify
more applicants correctly classified by the scoring system than it would
correctly reevaluate applications misclassified by scoring. In addition,
judgmental overrides increase the potential for discrimination in credit
analysis. Reintroduction of the human element necessarily includes
human biases and prejudices. The reviewing credit officer may use in-
formation about the applicant's appearance or demeanor that the sys-
tem does not find predictive or that the ECOA brands illegal.
In contrast to a judgmental system of credit analysis, an empiri-
cally derived credit system which is demonstrably and statistically
sound has the legal advantages of the statutory authorization to directly
consider the applicant's age and a potentially lighter burden of proof
than in an effects-test lawsuit.202 Accordingly, users of so-called "hy-
brid" systems want to bring their credit analysis within the Regulation
B definition of a demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically de-
rived credit system, notwithstanding their use of judgmental overrides.
In response to such requests, an official staff interpretation, promul-
gated shortly after Regulation B's effective date, authorizes inclusion of
nonscoring components in empirically derived credit systems. 20 3 The
nonscoring component must, however, comply with all requirements
imposed on judgmental systems and may not consider the applicant's
age directly. The entire system, including both the scoring and non-
scoring components, remains subject to the full impact of the effects
test.
The considerations that may have influenced the staff to approve
the use of hybrid systems parallel those affecting the Board's decision
regarding how rigorous to make standards for system validation.
2°4
201. Rosenberger, Measuring the Impact of Overrides, Part 1, ViEwpoiNTs, Fall/Winter
1977, at 1; Rosenberger, Mreasuring the Impact of Overrides, Part 3, ViEwPorTs, Win-
ter/Spring 1978, at 1. Often the officer considers information not available to the system
development process, such as applicant demeanor.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(3) (1976); ECO, supra note 14, at 107.
203. Federal Reserve Board Official Staff Interpretation EC-0006, 42 Fed. Reg. 21,605
(1977) in [1977] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 42,086.
204. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
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Admittedly, judgmental overrides probably decrease the overall accu-
racy of the system's predictions and may offer greater potential for
credit discrimination. However, purely judgmental systems tend to dis-
criminate illegally to an even greater extent. Nondiscrimination poli-
cies should therefore encourage use of scoring, even with judgmental
overrides, as the lesser of two unavoidable evils.
This conclusion necessitates the classification of hybrid systems as
empirical. Calling them judgmental systems would for several reasons
tend to discourage the continued development of scoring. In particular,
defining hybrid systems as empirically derived permits judgmental
creditors, undecided about the virtues of scoring, to gradually adopt
and experiment with such systems while retaining their familiar judg-
mental techniques as overrides. In addition, this designation permits
hybrid systems to continue direct consideration of age. To the extent
that age makes an excellent predictive characteristic, its consideration
improves the accuracy of the system's credit predictions and benefits
the elderly.
Borrowed systems
Regulation B's final pronouncement on credit scoring technology
concerns use of borrowed systems. 205 The Act itself neither authorizes
nor prohibits the transfer of scoring systems between creditors. How-
ever, because of the high development costs associated with even a sin-
gle scoring system the question of whether creditors can share their
systems with each other naturally arises. Other creditors need to be
able to borrow systems because their applicant populations do not have
sufficient size for statistical analysis in the development process.
Again, as with the standards for validation, competing scientific
and practical considerations apply. Researchers believe that the com-
position of applicants varies from creditor to creditor.2°6 Accordingly,
the scoring system that predicts well for one creditor may predict
poorly for another. Similarly, it may have a discriminatory impact on
one applicant population and not another. These factors militate
against permitting the unrestricted transfer of systems among different
users. On the other hand, scoring probably discriminates less than
205. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(3) (1978).
206. M. Long, Credit Scoring Development for Optimal Credit Extension and Manage-
ment Control, 1973 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis for Purdue University); Brandel, New Dangers
Arise in Point Scoring But You Can't Afford to be Without It, BANKING, Mar. 1976, at 86;
Gooch, A Methodfor Obtaining Personalized Credit Scoring Systems, THE CREDIT WORLD,
Mar. 1973, at 12; Hsia, supra note 159, at 794 n.87.
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judgmental analysis. The government should therefore avoid imposing
unduly rigorous performance and nondiscrimination standards on
scoring systems for fear of discouraging their adoption by additional
judgmental creditors.
Regulation B successfully accommodates these countervailing in-
terests3 °7 It permits borrowing of scoring systems but requires that the
creditor undertake validation tests as soon as it accumulates sufficient
information to do so. This approach enjoys the dual advantage of per-
mitting a creditor to avoid development costs by borrowing an existing
system while still affording its credit applicants considerable assurance
that the system processing their request will make accurate decisions.
Discrimination and Scoring
Notwithstanding the detailed proscriptions of Regulation B, its
limitations in no way foreclose all possible discrimination by credit
scoring systems. The Supreme Court describes discriminatory practices
as "invidious" and acknowledges that new ones will continually ap-
pear.20 8 Obviously, no single source can enumerate all the possible
scoring practices that might constitute illegal discrimination. Imagina-
tive users and applicants will eventually utilize, and challenge as dis-
criminatory, practices not presently known.
This section nevertheless seeks to highlight certain areas of scoring
that present potential ECOA problems. It will also attempt to point out
the pertinent considerations that will guide courts when they confront
potentially illegal scoring practices in the future. Deciding what prac-
tices constitute credit discrimination depends upon both the immutable
technical and economic aspects of the credit process and the case law
that interprets employment and housing antidiscrimination statutes.
Per se discrimination
As described in the preceding section, Regulation B imposes cer-
tain basic restrictions on scoring procedures in an attempt to reduce the
most egregious forms of credit discrimination. A system may not score
prohibited bases such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, mari-
tal status, receipt of public assistance, and exercise of consumer
207. Official explanatory material accompanying § 202.2(v) of Regulation B, 42 Fed.
Reg. 1,242, 1,243 (1977); ECO, supra note 14, at 105.
208. E.g., Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Buonoraba v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 316 F. Supp. 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp..
499, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
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rights. 20 9 Age may not receive a negative factor or value. Neither may
the system score additional attributes that Regulation B deems to con-
stitute indirect discrimination, such as alimony income, parenthood
plans, telephone listings, pension income, and availability of credit
insurance.
210
Notwithstanding the express nature of these prohibitions, one oc-
casionally encounters pre-ECOA systems that overtly violate even
these basic proscriptions. The author's experience includes systems
that score religion and systems that score telephone listings in the ap-
plicant's own name, an obvious handicap for married women. These
nonconforming systems typically represent the creditor officers' intui-
tive impressions rather than empirical conclusions. As public recogni-
tion of ECOA spreads, these few per se violations will presumably
disappear. The consumer compliance examinations of regulated credi-
tors, such as banks, conducted by federal authorities, as well as the




More frequently, scoring systems employ characteristics that do
not constitute per se violations but that may discriminate indirectly.
The probability of discrimination varies from situation to situation.
Consider a system that scores "housewife" as an occupation category.
This attribute consists primarily of married women. If "housewife" re-
ceives few points, does this constitute sex or marital status discrimina-
tion? Certainly it has an adverse impact upon a protected class.
However, empirically this treatment may be justified. Conversely,
prohibiting scoring of "housewife" could result in reclassification of
such applicants as "unemployed," presumably a category earning even
fewer points. Indeed, use of "unemployed" can itself present a prob-
lem of discrimination on the basis of age (retired) or receipt of public
assistance.
Even a practice as ordinary as scoring homeownership may pres-
ent potential discrimination. Certain protected classes of applicants
rent more frequently than either society at large or the creditor's appli-
cants taken as a whole. Even if homeownership proves an excellent
predictor of creditworthiness, this seemingly innocuous practice may
209. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(1) (1978).
210. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(3)-(5) (1978).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1976).
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violate the effects test or some other indirect measure of discrimination.
The preceding section suggests that future judicial action will articulate
new standards for measuring credit discrimination but that their even-
tual perimeters remain obscure. Almost all applicant characteristics
correlate negatively with some protected class.
Currently, much controversy surrounds the use of geographic
characteristics by scoring systems. Some systems processing applicants
on a nationwide basis assign different numbers of points to residents of
different states or multistate regions. 212 Other systems allocate points
based on the applicant's ZIP code or even smaller geographic zones.
Still other systems score urban, suburban, and rural addresses differ-
ently. In a properly developed system, this geographic disparity pre-
sumably derives from the varying credit performance of local residents.
Critics charge that consideration of geographic characteristics may
result in pretextual or even inadvertent discrimination against minori-
ties.213 Others criticize this practice as illegal "redlining" contributing
to the unnecessary deterioration of marginal neighborhoods. 214 Alto-
gether too much controversy and too little nonpartisan research sur-
rounds these charges because of their highly political nature.
This criticism ignores several countervailing considerations. First,
the degree of disparate impact on minorities will vary from system to
212. Proposed Federal Home Loan Bank Board Antidiscrimination Regulations, (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. 528,531) 42 Fed. Reg. 58,953 (1977); Andrews & Shier, Redlining- Why
MakeA Federal Case Out oflt, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. Rv. 813 (1976); Benston, The Persistent
Myth of Redlining, FORTUNE, Mar. 13, 1978, at 66; Earthman, Residential Mortgage
Lending- Charting a Course Through the Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REv. 957 (1976);
Fefferman, The Redlining of Neighborhoods by Mortgage Lending Institutions and What Can
Be Done About It, REDLINING (Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n Special Rep., 1976); Hood &
Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing
Services As A fiable Alternative, 7 URB. LAw. 510 (1975); Nelson, Some Perspectives on
Redlining, REDLINING (Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n Special Rep., 1976); Reene, Eliminating
Redlining by Judicial Actior Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 987 (1976); Van
Alstyne, Redlining-The Cure Worse Than the Illness, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 264 (1977); Red-
lining and the Home Mortgage DisclosureAct of 1975:A Decisive Step Towards Private Urban
Redevelopment, 25 EMORY L.. 667 (1976); Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56
B.U.L. Rav. 989 (1976); Mortgage Dicriraination" Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Home
Financing Through the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 139 (1975); Redlin-
ing-he Fight Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. U.L.J. 71 (1975); Redlin-
ing: Remediesfor the Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FOpDHAM L. Rav. 83 (1976).
213. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
214. Redlining charges occur most frequently in connection with mortgage lending, an
area that rarely employs credit scoring. Cf. F. Dotson, Development of a Numerical Scoring
System for Evaluating Mortgage Loan Delinquency Risk (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis
submitted to the University of South Carolina) (suggesting the development of at least one
mortgage scoring system).
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system. Controlled research might well reveal that certain systems
scoring geographic characteristics, particularly those whose attributes
embrace large areas, have no discriminatory effect. Second, while red-
lining may seem socially undesirable, this does not necessarily make it
illegal.215 Mere stupidity should not automatically inspire governmen-
tal intervention. Third, banning use of geographic characteristics may
not have the effect desired by its advocates. If the "location of the ap-
plicant's residence" predicts creditworthiness well and no substitute for
it exists, then its exclusion will mean less accurate credit analysis. This
increased risk will make creditors more reluctant to lend to applicants
who are economically marginal. Economically marginal applicants
comprise the group most in need of credit, the group most likely to live
in redlined neighborhoods, and the group critics of geographic scoring
are most eager to protect.216 Outright prohibition of redlining could
have unanticipated, counterproductive effects.
Conversely, if "applicant location" predicts well, and a good sub-
stitute for it does exist, then the redlining problem merely is displaced
one step further. System developers will replace location with a substi-
tute characteristic, such as age and condition of dwelling. The end re-
sult will not change, although the substitute may not appear as
"discriminatory" and may not be the object of political criticism. It
may, however, have the same aggregate effect on the same group of
applicants. Advocates of direct substitution argue that the replacement
characteristic relates to applicant creditworthiness, whereas the appli-
cant's ZIP code does not. This argument ignores the fact that discrimi-
nant analysis only selects the characteristics that predict
creditworthiness well. It does not investigate why they predict well.
Scoring has not yet advanced to the point of including causal analysis.
Authorities on equal credit opportunity foresee considerable litiga-
tion before resolving the geographic scoring issue.
Multiple systems
A related problem concerns the use of multiple systems by a single
215. Scoring Doesn't Redline, VIEWPOINTS, Fall 1977, at 3. The Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act prohibits racial discrimination in credit transactions, not consideration of a geo-
graphic area associated with the transaction. Whether redlining has the effect of racial
discrimination remains unresolved. Pending enactment of one of the bills enumerated at
note 26 supra, any legal attack on redlining, other than through the ECOA effects test, must
rely upon the statutory authority of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-128, tit. VIII, 91 Stat. 1111, 1147 (1977); or possibly the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1976).
216. Fair, -4 Dubious Process of Subsidy, ViEwPorNTs, Winter 1978, at 2.
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creditor. Creditors currently use different systems for different appli-
cants based upon geography, demographics, type of credit, or other
preliminary screening considerations.21 7 Thus, some creditors process
applications from all over the country using a single system, with or
without scoring geographic characteristics. Other national creditors
employ a different system for each of half a dozen regions. Still others
build a different system for each branch or store.
Other users of scoring systems route applicants under thirty years
of age to one system and those over thirty to another system. Research-
ers have experimented with processing male and female applicants into
different systems. Full service banks offering several credit cards, over-
draft accounts, and various installment programs frequently apply
scoring to some lines of business and not to others. A few creditors
direct old customers to one means of analysis and new applicants to
another, or have applicants rejected by one system reanalyzed for pos-
sible reconsideration by a second system.
To date, the number of systems used by a creditor, and the appli-
cant subpopulations they cover, has remained a business decision. The
creditor deploys multiple systems because of the increased accuracy
they confer upon the various subpopulations affected. It continues to
subdivide the population into smaller and smaller units until the in-
creased profit from improved accuracy no longer offsets the costs of
additional systems development. From a technical standpoint, only the
need for a large applicant base for each system's construction prevents
the use of multiple systems for applicants with different attributes,
rather than simply incorporating and scoring those differences.218
Multiple systems now present the question of whether their use or
nonuse can discriminate. Consider creditor A that puts applications
from both males and females into a single system. If eighty percent of
its applications come from males, then the development sample from
which the system derives would also include about eighty percent
males. Frequently, characteristics that predict well for male applicants
do not work as well for female applicants.219 In the single system, how-
ever, the better predictors for females are submerged in the largely
male development sample.
Contrast the single system user with creditor B that develops two
systems based on separate samples of male and female applicants. Al-
217. CHANDLER & EWERT, supra note 183; Churchill, Nevin & Watson, Credit Scor-
ing-Hw Many Systems Do We Need? THE CREDrr WORLD, Nov. 1977, at 6.
218. See text accompanying note 70 suepra.
219. CHANDLER & EWERT, supra note 183.
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though its future applicants may consist primarily of males, its few fe-
male applicants are processed by a separate system that incorporates
those characteristics that best predict female creditworthiness. As a re-
sult of this increased accuracy, creditor B extends much more credit to
females than creditor A at the same level of risk. It should also confer
slightly more credit on male applicants.220
The business preferability of one system as opposed to multiple
systems will vary depending upon the individual creditor's own situa-
tion. Whether ECOA compels one approach or another remains uncer-
tain. ECOA prohibits credit analysis from considering the applicant's
membership in a protected class such as sex.221 Certainly a system
could not legally make the applicant's sex a scored characteristic. The
question is whether analyzing the creditworthiness of applicants using
different criteria because of their sex, consitutes taking "a prohibited
basis into account." It would certainly appear so, especially if discrimi-
nation means treating one applicant dfferenty from another because of
a prohibited bias.2
22
On the other hand, Regulation B may support such dual systems
because it defines discrimination as treating "an applicant less
favorably than other applicants. '223 Increasing the information avail-
able for credit analysis makes the system more accurate and allows the
creditor to approve more applications while maintaining the same level
of risk. If it can take the applicant's sex into account by using two
systems, as suggested above, usually more applicants will receive credit.
The multisystem creditor, that sets its cutoff scores so that its systems
have equal repayment rates or comparable rates of profitability, could
persuasively argue that it does not treat any applicants less favorably
because of their sex. It does handle their applications differently be-
cause of their sex, but not less favorably.
A similar conclusion follows with respect to similar divisions of
applicant population for development of multiple systems. The credi-
tor that has a different system for each store or branch can make more
accurate decisions. Presumably, the credit applicants in suburban
Scarsdale have different attributes from those in rural Mississippi.
However, the extra accuracy means developing more systems and in-
curring proportionately higher costs. At least indirectly, it appears to
220. Id.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976); Regulation B, § 202.6(b)(1) (1978).
222. Compare Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal.
1972) with Wimberly v. Georgia So. & P. Ry., 5 Ga. App. 263, 63 S.E. 29 (1908).
223. Regulation B, § 202.2(n) (1978).
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take into account the location of the applicant's residence. On the
other hand, this type of geographic consideration gives considerably
more credit to the applicants from marginal neighborhoods, who would
be rejected by a single system because of their lower economic status.
Clearly, consideration of location by multiple systems warrants so-
cial encouragement, but how does it differ from merely scoring ZIP
code? Possibly, the way the competing alternatives use geography
serves to distinguish them. A single system that scores the location of
an applicant's residence, of the applicant's employer, or even of the
branch of the creditor at which the application was submitted can use
the attribute to automatically reject almost all applicants from that
area. A system that scores only applications from the same area auto-
matically grants credit to a predictable fraction of the requests. Be-
cause of its better predictive ability, fewer local applicants would be
rejected by the multiple system.
The scoring of age and the prohibition against assigning it a nega-
tive factor or value may provide a partial analogy. By dividing the
applicant population along some basis, prohibited or not, and analyz-
ing the subpopulations separately, everybody gains. Each subpopula-
tion receives more credit and the creditor achieves greater accuracy.
Unfortunately, the ECOA contains no express authorization for
favorable consideration of prohibited basis other than age. This over-
sight may stem from the fact that Congress did not realize that multiple
systems can convert a zero-sum situation, one under which one sub-
population must lose in order that another may gain, into a nonzero-
sum situation where everybody can gain.
Conversely, neither does ECOA expressly prohibit multiple sys-
tems. Indeed, under certain circumstances, the general principle that
creditors should aggressively eliminate discrimination arguably com-
pels development of multiple systems.224 Accordingly, the eventual le-
gal resolution of the multiple system remains uncertain. Only the
technical requirement of a large enough applicant base for systems de-
velopment and the economic requirement of sufficient increased profit-
ability to offset extra development costs constrain the widespread use of
multiple systems and the eventual judicial disposition of the issues they
raise.
Overrides
As suggested in the preceding section, many creditors elect to over-
224. See text accompanying note 190 supra.
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ride the system's decision in selected cases. 225 The addition of a
nonmechanical "decision screen" reintroduces considerable opportu-
nity for discriminatory credit decisions notwithstanding the use of a
properly developed, nondiscriminatory scoring system. The potential
for discrimination through overrides will vary from case to case, de-
pending upon the pertinent facts and policies. ECOA litigation chal-
lenging overrides will therefore closely parallel litigation over purely
judgmental systems of credit analysis. For example, after scoring at
least sixty-two points, the applicant must also have an affirmative credit
report, certain collateral, or a present cash-flow ratio. Whether this
override discriminates will vary from creditor to creditor.
Prescreening
A related practice concerns prescreening of applicants before they
can be scored. Even using scoring, credit analysis has a cost. There-
fore, many creditors limit in arbitrary ways the applications they will
consider for scoring. For example, banks frequently will make loans
only to depositors who have used the bank for a certain period of time
or who maintain certain balances. Many creditors make a practice of
only extending credit to "local" residents. Another common prescreen-
ing device requires that applicants meet an income requirement or have
certain credit references before the creditor will consider processing
their credit requests.226 A more controversial practice consists of refus-
ing loans to finance the purchase of homes in certain neighborhoods.
Prescreening has two undesirable effects on otherwise neutral scor-
ing systems. First, the screen may itself discriminate, at least under the
effects test. Prescreening that eliminates applicants who have not main-
tained bank accounts for at least the two preceding years might have a
disproportionate impact on the young or on recipients of public assist-
ance.227 Screening out loans to residents of selected neighborhoods
may discriminate against minority applicants. Most prescreening ap-
pears vulnerable to similar challenges, although the degree of disparate
225. See text accompanying note 200 supra.
226. Eg., Letter from Edward S. Cogan to the Director of the Division of Consumer
Affairs, Federal Reserve Board (Sept. 30, 1977) (on file under Docket No. EC-513); Letter
from Lucien A. Dancause to the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs, Federal
Reserve Board (Feb. 3, 1977) (on fie under Docket No. EC-37).
227. NATIONAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED
STATES 71 (Final Report, 1977); accord, I. FRIEND, INDIVIDUALS' SAVINGS: VOLUME AND
COMPASSION (1954); R. GOLDSMITH, A STUDY OF SAVINGS IN THE UNITED STATES (1955);
U.S. SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, CONSUMER SURVEY ON SAVING HABITS (1954).
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impact will vary depending upon the circumstances surrounding that
particular creditor or device.
A second objection to prescreening arises on technical grounds.
Both scientific principles and Regulation B require that the system pre-
dict the creditworthiness for the population consisting of all the credi-
tor's applicants.228 Only a system developed from a sample of this
"true applicant population" can accurately predict credit performance.
Prescreening on any basis prevents creditor's files from fully repre-
senting the true applicant population. Because the files reflect only a
portion of the true applicant population, any system developed using a
sample drawn from those files will reflect the statistical biases of the
subsample. 29 Not only will the resultant system predict poorly, but it
may also have unnecessary adverse effects on protected classes of appli-
cants. The creditor exacerbates these problems if it applies the screen-
ing device inconsistently or intentionally changes it.230 It then puts into
the scoring system a totally different subpopulation from the one it
used to construct the system. Inaccuracy necessarily ensues with possi-
bly unnecessary discriminatory impact.
Notwithstanding the legal and technical undesirability of prescree-
ning, its suppression will entail considerable difficulty. Creditors will
naturally evince considerable reluctance to abandon traditional prac-
tices that seem to have a business purpose and to work effectively.
Plaintiffs will encounter evidentiary problems when proving the exist-
ence of the screening device and measuring its effect.
A corollary to the prescreening problem recurs in the form of self-
screening and steering. The preceding discussion assumes that the true
applicant population consists of all those who want credit from this
creditor and that screening occurs only after they formulate this de-
sire.2-3 Therefore, by obtaining written applications from everyone
228. Regulation B, § 202.2(p)(2)(i) (1978); see text accompanying note 78 supra.
229. BLALOCK, supra note 46, at 527-28; HuFF, How TO LIE wrrH STATISTICS 11 (1954).
230. Suppose the creditor's official "policy" requires $12,000 minimum income. Exami-
nation of the institution's files reveals, however, several loans to persons not meeting this
standard. These persons turn out to be the credit manager's son-in-law, the local minister,
creditor employees, and other "special" cases. The creditor has applied its screen inconsis-
tently. Any sample drawn from the creditor's files suffers from the double statistical bias of
underrepresenting applicants with less than $12,000 income, while concomitantly reflecting
an unrepresentative group of those applicants.
231. This true population does not consist of all local residents or all local credit custom-
ers. Cf. Green v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (alternative defini-
tions for the applicant population). A person who does not want credit clearly should not
appear in the applicant population. Whether the population includes a person who wants
credit but applies elsewhere remains unclear.
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who walks through the creditor's door (often referred to as the
"through door population" by system developers), the adverse impact
of screening is excised, or at least mitigated. Unfortunately, the real
story becomes somewhat more complex because screening can also oc-
cur before the applicant enters the creditor's premises, indeed before
the applicant can decide to apply to any particular creditor. The third
party that actively "steers" the would-be applicants to certain creditors
and away from others, before they file applications, changes the com-
position of the "through door population. ' 232 Similarly, a successful
advertising campaign that reaches applicants not previously served by
that creditor will also alter the demographic and economic characteris-
tics of the true applicant population. Because of changes in the public's
perception of the institution's credit standards and of the nature of its
clientele, new types of applicants "self-steer" themselves towards and
away from the creditor.233 Indeed, even without special advertising, a
creditor projects a certain image to the public that encourages or dis-
courages applications from certain segments of the populace.
This behavior pattern raises a quasi-ontological question: What
persons comprise a creditor's true applicant population? Clearly the
"through the door population" is included. What about persons who
decided to apply with that creditor but who somehow were steered
away? Indeed, how about those who needed credit, but did not think
of applying with the creditor because of a fear of rejection or for some
other reason? Presumably the consumer who never heard of the credi-
232. Such third parties might include a real estate broker, a seller of consumer goods, or
other persons who advise the consumer about sources of financing incident to a sale. Cer-
tain types of steering have provoked considerable controversy in housing-discrimination
cases, United States v. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1975); Topic v. Circle
Realty, 377 F. Supp. 111 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich.
1973). Credit scoring methodology objects to all such steering and screening practices, but
for different reasons. Steering skews the composition of the "through the door" population
and makes it statistically unrepresentative of the true applicant population, quite apart from
whether it discriminates illegally.
233. Behavioral scientists remain uncertain about what factors influence decisions by
consumers. G. DAY & W. BRANDT, A STUDY OF CONSUMER CREDIT DECISIONS: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR PRESENT & PROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION 4 (National Comm'n on Consumer Fi-
nance, Technical Studies, vol. I, 1972); accord, T. DURKIN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT
SURVEY (Federal Reserve Board, 1978); Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. & Marketing Sci-
ence Institute, Consumerism at the Crossroads (1977) (survey commissioned by Sentry In-
surance); Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., A Study of Big Ticket Purchasing Patterns
(1977) (survey commissioned by Ziff-Davis Publishing Company); Warland, Hermann &
Willits, Dissatisfied Consumers" Who Gets Upset and Who Takes Action, 9 J. CONS. AFF. 1948
(1975).
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tor does not fall into the true applicant population, regardless of the
creditor's advertising practices.
Some observers may conclude that only the applicants actually
walking through the door and requesting credit should constitute the
true applicant population. One becomes an "applicant" only by actu-
ally asking for credit. Others would argue, however, that such a view
takes a too limited perspective of the effect of creditor advertising poli-
cies and of creditor responsibilities to the community it serves.234 A
creditor that indirectly discourages a protected class of applicants from
ever applying discriminates just as much as one that scores a prohibited
characteristic, even though the steering may result in no tangible evi-
dence of disparate impact.235 Thus, a valid argument can be made that
the true applicant base includes people who wanted to apply for credit,
but did not do so. Only by comparing this more inclusive population to
the "through the door population" can the observer detect discrimina-
tory steering. Isolating this true applicant base also gives the system
developer more complete data from which to construct a more accurate
scoring system that deteriorates less when the "through the door popu-
lation" changes.
Unfortunately, determining the practices that cause the various
types of steering and measuring their effects on the "through the door
population" present considerable scientific and evidentiary uncertain-
ties. How does one determine who did not apply? One possible solu-
tion uses consumer-behavior theory. Researchers hypothesize that
consumer actions occur through a four-step process, problem recogni-
tion, problem comprehension, attitude formation, and overt behavior.
Thus, the consumer first recognizes a need for certain goods or money.
Analysis of this need results in recognition that credit would assuage
this need and that several possible sources of credit exist. The con-
sumer then analyzes the sources and develops a favorable attitude to-
wards one of them, possibly because of price, convenience, or some
similar consideration. Finally, the consumer takes action on the basis
of the attitude, and actually applies for credit.
The question then becomes, why did the consumer not choose to
apply to this particular creditor? The choice might depend upon "ra-
234. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. R. REP. No. 236, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on S. 406
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
235. Regulation B requires that creditors retain copies of all applications and related
materials for 25 months, 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b) (1978). However, the creditor defines what
constitutes an application. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f) (1978).
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tional" factors such as interest rate, or on potentially discriminatory
factors such as third party steering or slanted advertising. At present,
survey research has only just commenced investigating this hypotheti-
cal behavioral process.236 However, no superior approaches to the
steering problem have yet appeared. In conclusion, prescreening in all
forms seems most undesirable, but the point at which it becomes illegal
remains uncertain.
Cutoff scores
Another potential discriminatory practice occurs at the other end
of the credit-analysis process, when the creditor sets its cutoff score. As
described in Section III, the system developer generates a repayment-
probability table that shows, for a range of scores, what repayment rate
and acceptance rate the user can expect.2 37 The creditor selects its cut-
off score based upon its business strategy and the degree of risk it
wishes to support. It applies this cutoff to all future applications and
may adjust the cutoff in response to its changing business outlook.
This apparently mechanical process may discriminate because of
the complete creditor discretion in establishing the cutoff. By selecting
a particularly high cutoff, the creditor can intentionally exclude a very
high percentage of minorities, young people, or working women, for
example. Where the creditor selects a high cutoff because it desires to
do business only with white, male executives, it reflects improper
intent.23 8
Even where the creditor selects the cutoff for purely economic rea-
sons, a violation of the effects test may occur. The creditor merely in-
tends to reduce credit losses to an absolute minimum during a time of
high costs for money. However, if this decision excludes disproportion-
ate numbers of applicants from a protected class, then at least a prima
facie case of discrimination exists.
239
Creditors also use scoring cutoffs to set credit limits on open-end
credit such as credit cards and check-overdraft plans.2  Applicants
scoring more points receive higher credit limits. Setting the required
score unreasonably high or the credit limits unreasonably low, could
236. T. DURKIN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (Federal Reserve Board, 1978).
237. Orgler, supra note 27.
238. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
239. See text accompanying notes 151-60 supra.
240. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
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under circumstances similar to those posited above, violate the ECOA
as discriminatory.
Assuming consistency
Section II notes that all credit analysis rests upon the assumption
that the future will resemble the past.241 Future satisfactory applicants
will have the same attributes as past satisfactory applicants. Strong sta-
tistical and historical evidence supports the validity of this assumption.
Such an assumption would, however, provoke any civil-rights ad-
vocate familiar with other types of discrimination litigation. The rele-
vant case law repeatedly attacks practices based on an assumption of
consistent behavior over time.24 2 The fact that prison inmates of differ-
ent races have proven disruptive when sharing cells does not justify a
policy of permanently segregating prisoners by race.2 4 3 A high dropout
rate among married high school students does not imply that a particu-
lar student should not participate in extracurricular activities for fear of
interfering with marital responsibilities. 2 "4 A job which requires lifting
heavy weights or working long hours does not necessarily require a
male to fill it.245 Civil-rights laws are purposely designed to challenge
traditional assumptions and stereotypes about the behavior of particu-
lar groups and their proper roles in society.
Proponents of this theory argue that the scoring system does not
know how rejected applicants would have performed. It denies credit
to many applicants who would have repaid satisfactorily if given the
opportunity. Furthermore, even if a particular group did prove non-
creditworthy in the past, this does not mean that it will necessarily re-
tain that attribute in the future.
These arguments may have validity for other types of discrimina-
tion and possibly for judgmental systems of credit analysis. The empir-
ical foundation of scoring, however, rebuts each of the assertions.
First, in the aggregate, the system development process takes into ac-
count how rejects would have performed. The repayment probability
table and the augmented frequency count of the accepted applicants
241. See text accompanying note 42 .supra.
242. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 343 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
243. See Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
244. Moran v. School Dist. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
245. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971). However, an applicant's sex does constitute a bo-
nafide occupational qualification for certain jobs. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (prison guard for sex offenders).
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serve as a basis for calculation of both the number of applicants re-
jected at any cutoff score and the percentage of creditworthy applicats
among the rejects.246 By comparing the total number of creditworthy
applicants below the cutoff with the total of noncreditworthy appli-
cants, one arrives at the projected repayment rate for the reject popula-
tion, seventy-two percent for example. This repayment rate among the
reject population must necessarily amount to less than the ninety-two
percent repayment rate among the accepted population.
Notwithstanding the preceding conclusion that most rejected ap-
plicants would repay if given credit, it does not necessarily follow that
the creditor should approve their requests. The system cannot fully
distinguish between creditworthy rejects and noncreditworthy rejects
over most of a range of scores. Accepting more of the reject population
means incurring a marginal repayment rate of only seventy-two per-
cent. This compromise may seem to exclude a considerable number of
creditworthy applicants, but their acceptance could entail high losses
because of the lopsided relationship between profit on a satisfactory
account and loss on an unsatisfactory account.247
Finally, scoring accepts the principle that a particular group's
credit performance may change over time.248 As change occurs, the
system's performance decays. The developer rebuilding the system will
investigate the causes of the deterioration and allow for changes in each
group's creditworthiness. This process has the advantage of adjusting
to changes as they actually occur, instead of requiring, as judgmental
systems do, the creditor to either guess at the nature of the changes or
increase risks by actually extending credit to measure whether change
has occurred.
Potential Technical Objections to Scoring
The foregoing concludes the substantive part of this Article. There
remain certain minor, technical issues that pertain to the relationship
between scoring technology and Regulation B's specific rules for non-
discriminatory credit administration. Most of these flow from over-
literal interpretation of the regulation's text or the scientific constraints
on the methodology, rather than from any potential for real
discrimination.
246. See Figure 1, supra.
247. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
248. See text accompanying note 124 supra; deKerchove, Tracking a Scoring System,
VIEWPOINTS, Fall 1977, at 1; Fair, Validation of a Scoring System, What Is It? Why Do It?,
ViWPoINTs, Summer 1977, at 2.
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Mandatory income consideration
Section 202.6(b)(5) states that "[W]here an applicant relies on ali-
mony, child support, or separate maintenance payments in applying for
credit, a creditor shall consider such payments as income to the extent
they are likely to be consistently made."249 Prior to ECOA, creditors
commonly refused to consider alimony income as a source of payment
for credit.250 They apparently reasoned that ex-spouses rarely pay ali-
mony as agreed or awarded, making this type of income unreliable.
This practice has highly adverse effects on divorced and separated wo-
men trying to obtain credit.
Applied literally to scoring, this provision may mean that if an
applicant discloses alimony income the system must score it. Income,
however, does not appear as a characteristic at all on most scoring
sheets. It rarely predicts creditworthiness well enough to warrant inclu-
sion. It would seem most anomalous to mandate scoring of one type of
income while essentially barring use of another type of income, espe-
cially in cases where neither contributes to the system's accuracy.
This anomaly stems in part from overly broad drafting. In the
sentence preceding the quoted passage, the drafters apparently seek to
prohibit similar, arbitrary exclusion of retirement income for consider-
ation by creditors. There they provide that "[A] creditor shall not dis-
count or exclude from consideration the income of an applicant or the
spouse of the applicant because of a prohibited basis or because the
income is derived from part-time employment, or from an annunity,
pension, or other retirement benefit . . . ."25 This formulation does
not mandate scoring of retirement income unless the creditor also
scores other types of income, thereby avoiding the whole problem.
Indeed, this alternative statement may point to a way of defining
away the whole problem. Regulation B authorizes a creditor to con-
sider any information obtained, so long as it does not use it to discrimi-
nate on a prohibited basis.2s2 In the absence of discrimination, -the
creditor may evaluate the information any way it sees fit. This system
does not consider income at all. It therefore accords alimony income
exactly the same weight as all other types of income. Where no dis-
crimination occurs, Regulation B authorizes the usage of such informa-
tion, regardless of the type of system involved. This reasoning may
249. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1978) (emphasis added).
250. Hearings on HA 14856 & .A 14908 Before the Subcommittee on ConsumerAffairs
of the House Committee on Banking & Currency, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 357 (1974).
251. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1978) (emphasis added).
252. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1978).
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seem sophistic, but would rebut this purely technical ECOA violation
quite nicely.
Joint applications
The preceding discussion assumes that the applicant requests
credit alone. Frequently, however, several persons apply for a loan
jointly. The mechanism by which scoring should process joint applica-
tions has not yet received much discussion.
Regulation B hardly mentions joint applications and their evalua-
tion.253 A creditor does not have to offer joint credit. However, the
prohibition against marital status discrimination clearly indicates that
if the creditor does offer joint credit, then it cannot limit its availability
to married couples.2 54 This paucity of regulatory guidance presently
leaves the question of scoring joint applications largely unresolved.
Suppose the system scored home ownership. One joint applicant owns
a home, but the coapplicant rents. How should this be scored? On the
other hand, suppose the system scores income, and one applicant has a
large income and the other a small income. Should their joint income
be scored? Would the same rationale apply to scoring the age of a
young applicant and an old applicant?
Several reasonable solutions exist. One approach would construct
separate scoring systems for joint applications and individual applica-
tions.2 55 The characteristics analyzed for possible inclusion during the
development of the joint application system would include: first appli-
cant's characteristic (auto, for example), second applicant's characteris-
tic (auto), and their joint characteristic (two autos). Conceivably, the
car owned by the second applicant might predict creditworthiness,
while the car of the first applicant would not. Alternately, the joint
debt-to-income ratio might perform well, when the individual ratios
perform poorly alone.
A second approach would develop a single system for all applica-
tions, but include analysis of joint applicants' characteristics and of
combined characteristics. Under certain circumstances, the final sys-
tem would score certain attributes of a second applicant or of both ap-
plicants, with varying impacts dependent on the data used.
253. Regulation B, §§ 202.5(c)(2)(ii), .7(d)(1), .10, .13(c) (1978).
254. Regulation B, § 202.4 (1978); Letter from Anne Geary, Federal Reserve Board staff,
to Richard Thompson (Dec. 1, 1977) (on file under Docket No. EC-514); Letter from Robert
Plows, Federal Reserve Board staff, to W.R. Loffis (Mar. 14, 1978) (on ifie under Docket No.
RS-19).
255. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
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A final, although possibly less satisfactory, approach would incor-
porate the number of applicants or cosigners as a second characteristic,
if its predictive power so warrants.256 Thus, an individual application
might get fourteen points and a joint application only three. To the
extent a characteristic predicts, the system should use it. Traditional
credit analysis assumes credit to be more secure if the transaction has a
cosigner. However, scoring may not always confirm this presumption.
If joint applications default at a higher rate than individual applica-
tions, then the former characteristic could cause the application to actu-
ally lose points.
Assumption of normality
For highly technical reasons beyond the scope of this Article the
mathematics of discriminant analysis require that the two subpopula-
tions used in system development form normal curves of equal vari-
ance.2 7 Thus, a plot of frequency counts over scores received should
describe two curves of approximately the same size and shape.258 The
curves can center on different parts of the graph, but should have the
same shape. The difference between the centers of the curves depicts
the scoring system's success at separating creditworthy and non-
creditworthy applicants.
Figure 9-Normal subpopulations of equal variance
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Applicant populations rarely satisfy this "normality" requirement.
More frequently, the developer finds the creditworthy subpopulation
clustered together forming a curve of narrow width and great height,
while the noncreditworthy subpopulation covers a great width with lit-
tle height.259
256. Interview with Howard Schneider, Vice President Bankers Trust, in New York City
(May 2, 1977).
257. See authorities cited note 56 supra.
258. DuRAND, supra note 6, at 109.
259. Concepts of Scoring, supra note 17, at 10.
November 1978] CREDIT SCORING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL




0 X 0 X
At present, no good solution exists to the problem of applicant
populations that violate the assumption of normality. Developers often
elect to ignore it, reasoning that use of nonnormal subpopulations will
not downgrade overall system performance significantly. They also
note that existing methods make correct predictions at a rate deemed
acceptable for business purposes. At the same time, theoreticians are
investigating techniques for adjusting the applicant population to sta-
tistically conform to the assumption of normality.260
Conclusion
Almost everything about the interaction of credit scoring and
ECOA remains unsettled. Regulation B defines a demonstrably and
statistically sound, empirically derived credit system, but users of scor-
ing do not know whether their systems conform to its requirements.
The law also defines credit discrimination, but lawyers cannot decide
whether scoring systems infringe this prohibition. This universal un-
certainty stems from the underdeveloped condition of the law, insuffi-
cient dissemination of knowledge about the operation of credit scoring,
and the evidentiary difficulty of establishing whether a particular sys-
tem discriminates.
This Article seeks to dispel some of the obscurity surrounding the
first two causes of uncertainty. It suggests that future judicial decisions
should give full attention to the empirical aspects of scoring when ap-
plying principles borrowed from other areas of antidiscrimination liti-
gation not having comparable levels of statistical certainty. The third
cause of uncertainty, however, must await judicial clarification on a
case by case basis.
260. Eisenbeis, supra note 65, at 16; Pitfalls, supra note 65. A similar technical problem
may arise from artificial constraints on the development process as described at note 102
supra.
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